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ABSTRACT
What fraction of college-age youths in the United States comes from credit-constrained
families? Can subjective assessments of financial difficulties inform the debate about
pervasiveness of credit constraints in the demand for college education? My disserta-
tion contains two essays addressing these questions.
Credit constraints in education may lead to inefficient skill allocations and
perpetuate imbalances in the distribution of economic well-being. Unfortunately,
empirical evidence regarding their pervasiveness in the United States has not been
consistent, in part because constraints tend to be inferred indirectly. The first essay
evaluates how a potentially more direct measure can be used to enhance our un-
derstanding of the issue. I focus on subjective assessments of financial limitations
available in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 and find that about 12
percent of college-age individuals expect to underinvest in education because of finan-
cial reasons or the need to work. While the measure developed in this paper is noisy
and not a precise indicator of credit constraints, it appears to capture important vari-
ations in educational choices, beyond these captured by the standard controls, such
as parental income.
The contribution of the second essay is the use of parents’ reports of borrowing
limitations in the NLSY79 Young Adult Supplement to evaluate the proportion of
constrained college-age youths in the early 2000s. The focus on the 2000s is critical
because the sharp increase in tuition costs and gradual erosion of real student bor-
rowing limits over the past two decades have potentially made credit constraints in
education more widespread. My analysis sample is limited to children of young moth-
ers who are more likely to be disadvantaged economically and hence are of specific
interest to policy-makers. Over one-fifth of youths in the sample come from families
where mothers report borrowing limitations. Conditional on scholastic ability, family
income, and family background characteristics, parental constraints have a strong
negative correlation with children’s college attendance. Although my results do not
distinguish between alternative explanations for borrowing limitations, they do sug-
gest that researchers interested in the connection between liquidity constraints and
education might benefit from paying more attention to direct measures.
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1Chapter 1
Financial Constraints in the Demand for Education: Evidence from
Subjective Assessments
1.1 Introduction
What proportion of potential college students expects to underinvest in college edu-
cation because of financial constraints? Is this a reliable assessment of the fraction
of credit-constrained students in the United States? Conditional on standard socioe-
conomic characteristics and ability indicators, are subjective constraints correlated
with educational attainment, enrollment delays or quality of education?
Economists have long been interested in the issue of credit constraints in ed-
ucation because they imply an inefficient allocation of resources and may work to
perpetuate and widen income inequality across generations. Economics literature
documents substantial disparities in educational attainment by family socioeconomic
status.1 Given the sharp increase in education wage premiums over the past thirty
years, these disparities have worked to widen income gaps and increase inequality.2
While theory suggests that government intervention can help eliminate the negative
impacts of credit constraints, the existing empirical evidence shows that educational
subsidies appear to benefit mostly high- and middle-income groups.3 In light of these
tendencies, the questions of how widespread financial constraints are and who are the
constrained students has critical relevance for educational policy.
1See, for example, Manski (1992), Ellwood and Kane (2000), Cameron and Heckman (1998), and
Carneiro and Heckman (2002).
2Goldin and Katz (2007).
3Fender and Wang (2003) provide a detailed theoretical discussion on educational policies to
remedy the inefficiencies possibly resulting from credit constraints. For a comprehensive overview
of the distributional effects of financial aid programs, see Dynarski (2002).
2While a number of studies have addressed the issue, in the absence of direct
measures, researchers have had to rely on educational outcomes information and
theoretical insights to infer constraints.4 Some studies, for example, Manski (1992)
and Ellwood and Kane (2000), interpret disparities in educational attainment by
family income as evidence of credit constraints. Others (e.g., Kane, 1994) infer credit
constraints from the greater sensitivity of low-income students to tuition costs. Still
others appeal to an observation that marginal rates of return to education appear
higher than the average rates (see Card, 2001). By contrast, Carneiro and Heckman
(2002) argue that it is “long-run” family and environmental influences rather than
“short-term” liquidity constraints that largely determine educational outcomes. A
recent study by Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) made the first attempt to
use subjective assessments in evaluating the link between liquidity constraints and
educational attainment. Using unique new data from a small private college with
subsidized tuition, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner find that most college attrition is
unrelated to self-reported borrowing limitations.
This paper contributes to the literature by developing a new subjective mea-
sure of credit constraints in education using a standard data source. I examine how
individual assessments of financial difficulties in the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1979 (NLSY79) may enhance our understanding of credit constraints’ perva-
siveness in the demand for education. I denote as constrained those respondents who
expect to receive less education than desired for financial reasons or the need to work.
Keeping in mind that this classification is very general and not a precise definition
of credit constraints, I attempt to assess its information content and internal consis-
tency. I use regression analysis to determine whether the probabilities of reporting
4Prominent studies include Manski (1992), Ellwood and Kane (2000), Card (2001), Carneiro and
Heckman (2002), Cameron and Taber (2004), Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008).
3constraints vary in a predictable and systematic way with individual characteristics,
family resources, and educational costs. To determine if it captures any additional
variation in educational outcomes, I examine the correlations of my constraints in-
dicator with a number of schooling dimensions, conditional on standard controls for
ability and socioeconomic background.
About 12 percent of college-age adults in the NLSY79 report financial diffi-
culties in attaining their desired level of education. The analysis of correlations and
partial correlations of my measure with ability indicators, educational costs, and so-
cioeconomic characteristic indicates that it is a noisy measure. Not solely because
of the way it is constructed, this measure is more likely to capture low net ben-
efits to education rather than credit constraints, especially for men. At the same
time, my measure appears to covary in expected ways with parental education and
college proximity. Moreover, for men, subjective constraints are correlated with a
lower probability of graduating with a four-year degree, and higher probabilities of
delaying college enrollment and attending a lower quality school. For women, there
appears to be some significant correlations between subjective constraints and quality
of education.
My study presents an innovative subjective measure of financial constraints in
education and examines its validity as a potentially more direct indicator of credit con-
straints. While not a good basis for quantifying the proportion of credit-constrained
students in the United States, my measure appears to capture important aspects of in-
dividual heterogeneity in education, beyond that revealed by the standard indicators
of ability, parental income, and family background characteristics. To understand the
exact relationship between my measure and educational outcomes, however, explicit
modeling is required, which is beyond the scope of this study. This paper contributes
4to a growing body of literature showing that subjective measures are potentially
informative and deserve closer attention in the economics research.
1.2 Evidence of Credit Constraints in the Literature
What evidence does the literature offer regarding the pervasiveness of credit con-
straints in the demand for college education in the United States?5 This section
summarizes the literature’s most important findings and outlines my contribution.
College education is costly. An average family can expect to spend up to one-
fourth of its annual income to send one child to a public university for one year.6
Recognizing that capital markets for human capital investment are imperfect, the
U.S. government offers a wide range of subsidies that aim to alleviate the financial
burden associated with college education to encourage enrollment. To the extent that
these subsidies do not fully cover schooling costs, however, students themselves are
responsible to finance tuition and consumption while in college.7 In the absence of
labor market earnings, students have to rely on their savings, family resources, or
private sector loans. As a result, children from lower-income families may be less
capable of paying for college than children from higher-income families.
Consistent with this intuition, a number of economic studies have documented
sizable disparities in educational attainment by family income. Manski (1992), for
example, reports that only 11 percent of high school graduates from the low end
of family income distribution receive a college education within the subsequent five
5Throughout the paper I use the words credit constraints synonymously with liquidity constraints,
as does much of the related literature.
6The average annual cost of attending a four-year college, including room and board, was $13,589
for a public institution and $32,307 for a private institution in the 2007 - 2008 academic year (College
Board, 2008). The median household income of individuals under the age of 65 was $56,545 in 2007
(DeNavas-Walt et al., 2008).
7Belley, Frenette, and Lochner (2008) provide a detailed discussion of out-of-pocket costs of
college education in the U.S.
5years. This proportion is 39 percent for students from the top of the income distri-
bution. Similarly, Ellwood and Kane (2000) show that only 57 percent of children
from the lowest-income quartile attend a post-secondary educational institution after
graduating from high school, compared with 81 percent of children from the highest-
income quartile. These disparities are believed to provide support for the hypothesis
that credit constraints have a substantial impact on the demand for college education
in the United States.
An alternative explanation for these disparities comes from a strong relation-
ship between family income and other factors correlated with college attendance, for
example, scholastic ability and taste for learning. Children from families with higher
socioeconomic status often receive better primary and secondary education, which,
among other things, shapes their tastes for schooling and improves college readiness.
As a result, they are better prepared for college, on average, than students from lower-
income families and are more likely to receive a college education. Hence the “long-
run” family factors may be more relevant for the relationship between income and
education than “short-term” borrowing constraints (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002).
In support of this alternative explanation, Carneiro and Heckman show that dispari-
ties in educational attainment across income groups almost disappear when controls
for family background and scholastic ability are introduced. Using the same empirical
methodology, however, Belley and Lochner (2007) document a dramatic increase in
the correlation between family income and educational attainment across the two co-
horts of high school students surveyed in the early 1980s and the early 2000s. These
findings are likely to renew the debate about the pervasiveness of credit constraints
in college education.
Although current income is a convenient benchmark for assessing needs, some
studies argue that it is an imperfect measure of financial resources and the ability
6to pay for college (see Kane, 2004). Alternative indirect measures that perform bet-
ter include wealth and short-term income fluctuations. Jappelli (1990), for example,
shows that family wealth is a strong correlate of borrowing difficulties, even after
controlling for family income. Mayer (1997) finds that children from families that
experience a large earnings decline within a two-year period complete fewer years of
college education. Moreover, the link between changes over time in family income
distribution and educational attainment appears stronger than the link between in-
come and education estimated in cross-section(see, e.g., Mayer, 1997; Acemoglu and
Pischke, 2001).
Other evidence in the empirical microeconomic literature that are potentially
consistent with credit constraints includes higher sensitivity of low-income students
to tuition costs (Kane, 1994) and longer delays in college enrollment for students in
high-tuition states (Kane, 1996).
In the absence of a clear consensus about the pervasiveness of credit constraints
in the demand for education, a need for more direct evidence has emerged. The first
study to address this need is a recent work by Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008).
The authors use carefully designed survey questions to elicit information about college
students’ borrowing limitations and evaluate the fraction of college drop-out rate
attributable to these limitations. While their study is based on the data from a single
educational institution very different from most of U.S. colleges, Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner provide important insights into the link between borrowing constraints
and drop-out decisions of low-income youths.8
8Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner conduct their survey at Berea College, which is a small, private
four-year college in Kentucky with a mission of providing an education to students from low-income
backgrounds. Unlike most colleges in the United States, Berea College offers full tuition and a
room/board subsidy to all incoming students.
7The contribution of my paper is the use of a new subjective indicator of con-
straints in a standard data source, the NLSY79. I utilize subjective assessments of
financial difficulties in attaining a desired schooling level to pinpoint the respondents
potentially constrained in educational choices. Relying on a widely used data source
allows to view my results in the context of earlier studies and makes it possible to ac-
cess how my subjective measure may enhance more traditional methods of evaluating
financial obstacles to college education based on family socioeconomic status.
1.3 Operational Definitions and Data
In this section I present an operational definition of constraints. Unfortunately,
the NSLY79 data were not collected with an explicit purpose of identifying credit-
constrained respondents. As a result, the questions are not precisely formulated and
omit some relevant information. Below I explain the most important problems with
my definition and provide an assessment of their implications for my study. From
the preliminary data analysis it appears that, despite not being a precise definition of
credit constraints, my measure captures important aspects of financial status beyond
that of standard socioeconomic indicators.
To examine subjective assessments of constraints in education, I rely on a
well-studied nationally representative data set, the NLSY79. Because of its detailed
content, the NLSY79 has been extensively used by economists to evaluate the re-
lationship between credit constraints and education (see, e.g., Keane and Wolpin,
2001; Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Cameron and Taber, 2004; Belley and Lochner,
2007). It is a rich longitudinal data set that contains family background information
and scholastic aptitude measures essential for the analysis of educational attainment.
The NLSY79 has followed the respondents for over twenty-five years and collected
8detailed educational histories, making possible the analysis of multiple dimensions of
college education, such as delays in enrollment, time to a degree, and school quality.
Most importantly for this study, the NLSY79 contains information on respondents’
educational aspirations and expectations. Using this information, I derive an indica-
tor of financial constraints in education.
I use the answers respondents provide to three questions, asked during the
1982 wave of the survey. The questions elicit desired and expected education levels,
and the reasons for any discrepancies between the two. Desired education is elicited
by asking: “What is the highest grade or year of regular schooling that you would like
to complete?” Expected education comes from answers to the question: “As things
now stand, what is the highest grade or year [of schooling] you think you will actually
complete?” Those who expect to complete fewer years of schooling than desired are
asked: “What is the main reason that you expect to complete less regular schooling
than you would like to complete?” The format of the questions is multiple choice with
a wide set of options, including family responsibilities, academic ability, and financial
reasons (see Table 1.1). As an operational definition, I denote as constrained those
respondents who expect to receive less education than desired for financial reasons or
the need to work.
The focus of this study is young adults around the time they make post-
secondary schooling decisions. The group of interest is the youngest respondents in
the NLSY79: those who were between the ages of 14 and 18, inclusively, in January
1979. In 1982, when educational aspirations and expectations were recorded, they
were 17 to 21 years old. Following Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Belley and
Lochner (2007), I exclude from my analysis the respondents who were not living with
their parents at age 16 or 17, and those with missing parental income or the ability test
scores. The NLSY79 oversamples black, Hispanic, and economically disadvantaged
9white youths. In contrast to the earlier studies, I keep the minority and low-income
oversamples, because these groups are of particular interest to policymakers. The
final sample size is 5,164 individuals.9
Table 1.1 presents the distribution of answers to the question why expected
education is less than desired. In the sample, 1,175 respondents (23 percent) expect
less education than desired. Of these, 486 respondents (9 percent) report financial
reasons and 182 respondents (4 percent) report the need to work. Altogether, 668
respondents, or about 13 percent of the sample, are classified as constrained accord-
ing to the definition above. When reweighted to be nationally representative, the
proportion of constrained respondents is only slightly smaller, about 12 percent of
the sample.
Because men and women standardly differ in their educational and employment
histories due to childbirth and family care responsibilities, I also examine the reasons
separately by gender. The second and third columns of Table 1.1 show that men are
more likely to report a need to work or that school is too difficult, while women are
more likely to report family responsibilities. Since the need to work is included in
my definition of constraints, these differences warrant a separate analysis of men and
women.10
In the absence of more accurate data on constraints facing the NLSY79 re-
spondents, I use the definition above as a proxy. Hence there are a number of consid-
erations to keep in mind in attempting to use this measure to evaluate the fraction of
credit-constrained students in the data. Unlike in some other studies, for example in
9A total of 7,044 respondents ages 17 to 21 were interviewed in 1982. I drop 1,582 individuals
(22 percent) not living with their parents at age 16 or 17 and/or have missing parental income. In
addition, I exclude 298 respondents (4 percent) with missing AFQT scores, region of residence, or
other information.
10Recognizing potential gender differences, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) also stratify their anal-
ysis by gender.
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Table 1.1: Reasons for a Gap Between Desired and Expected Education, NLSY79
All Men Women Difference
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
N Percent N Percent N Percent T-stats.
Financial reasons 486 0.414 227 0.394 259 0.432 1.333
Have to work 182 0.155 116 0.201 66 0.110 4.350***
Family responsibilities 145 0.123 25 0.043 120 0.200 8.412***
School too difficult 53 0.045 37 0.064 16 0.027 3.108***
Health problems 1 0.001 1 0.002 0 0.000 1.019
Not necessary for job 46 0.039 27 0.047 19 0.032 1.338
Don’t like school 68 0.058 37 0.064 31 0.052 0.915
Other 194 0.165 106 0.184 88 0.147 2.096**
Total 1175 1.000 576 1.000 599 1.000
Notes: a) T-statistics for equality of means between men and women: *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05,
***P < 0.10.
the Berea Panel Study, the questions in the NLSY79 were not specifically formulated
to elicit information on credit constraints. Because my measure combines educational
expectations and aspirations with the information on financial difficulties its inter-
pretation is not straightforward. In interpreting the measure, it is useful to keep in
mind the set-up and basic results of a simple schooling choice model similar to the
one discussed in Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008). I outline these briefly in the
next paragraph.
Assume that an individual decided how much education to pursue by choosing
the schooling level that yields the highest expected present value of lifetime utility.
Lifetime utility is a function of consumption, among other things, and is financed
by an initial endowment and labor earnings. Earnings in skilled jobs require college
education and depend on skilled human capital. Earnings in unskilled jobs do not
require any education beyond high school and depend on unskilled human capital.
Skilled human capital is accumulated more efficiently by individuals with high scho-
11
lastic ability. Individuals maximize lifetime utility, subject to a standard lifetime
budget constraint.
If credit markets are imperfect, in addition to a lifetime budget constraint,
individuals may be faced with a constraint on borrowing. If this constraint is binding
in the sense that the constrained individual would like to borrow to pay tuition or
increase consumption during schooling, some individuals may choose not to attend
college, even though they would attend otherwise. One of the problems with my
indicator is that it does not point out the individuals with positive net expected
benefits to college education. The answers “financial reasons” and “need to work”
may simply imply that the direct costs or the opportunity costs of college education
outweigh the expected present value of an earnings increase associated with college
education. In this case, even if permitted to borrow, a person will not enter college,
and hence is not credit-constrained in the usual sense. This possibility implies that
my indicator of constraints may overestimate the proportion of constrained.
Moreover, some respondents may report financial difficulties in an attempt
to justify low educational expectations that are due to other factors, for example,
low scholastic abilities or low expected returns to education. This phenomenon is
commonly referred to as justification bias and would also imply that my indicator
may overestimate the proportion constrained. A justification bias usually arises then
respondents have incentives to report a specific condition (e.g., high self-reported
disability rates among early retirees).11
There is also a distinct possibility that my measure may underestimate the ac-
tual proportion constrained, because only those respondents who report a gap between
aspirations and expectations are asked the reasons question. If current or expected
11Given a wide range of socially-acceptable reasons, it is not clear, however, why respondents
trying to justify their low educational expectations would choose financial difficulties or a need to
work over other possible answers.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
All Constrained Unconstrained T-statsb
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.493 0.500 0.496 0.500 0.493 0.500 0.12
Black 0.135 0.342 0.132 0.338 0.136 0.343 0.35
Hispanic 0.061 0.239 0.076 0.265 0.059 0.236 2.16**
Age 18.975 1.397 19.234 1.313 18.940 1.404 4.19***
AFQT percentile 45.845 28.224 41.938 27.177 46.369 28.323 3.09***
Family Background Characteristics
Parental income 23,410 16,510 20,450 15,080 23,810 16,660 4.08***
Mother’s education 12.269 0.360 12.061 0.101 12.296 0.038 2.16**
Father’s education 12.923 0.051 12.568 0.128 12.968 0.555 2.86***
Number of siblings 3.229 2.233 3.465 2.335 3.197 2.217 2.47**
Local Characteristics
Avg. public tuition 1,147 374 1122 364 1150 376 1.44
Local college 0.867 0.339 0.869 0.338 0.867 0.340 0.11
Urban residence 0.764 0.425 0.741 0.439 0.767 0.423 1.16
N 5,164 668 4,496
Weighted proportion 100 11.8 88.2
Notes: a) All statistics are weighted by sampling weights. b) Income and tuition expressed
in 1979 dollars. c) Testing the hypothesis of equality of means across constrained and
unconstrained respondents: *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.10.
credit constraints reduce both aspirations and expectations, the reasons question may
not be asked.
The considerations above imply that my measure of constraints is noisy. More-
over, it is not clear whether it underestimates or overestimates the fraction of credit-
constrained students – those who forgo college education because of a difficulty to
finance tuition or consumption while in school. Although it is not possible to for-
mally test the implications of these considerations for my results, some intuition can
be gained from examining the characteristics of constrained and unconstrained re-
spondents. More specifically, if constrained respondents exhibit the characteristics
consistent with low expected benefits and high opportunity or direct costs of edu-
13
cation, this would indicate that my measure is likely to overestimate the proportion
constrained.
To provide some initial evidence, Table 1.2 reports sample means of individual
characteristics, family background variables, and schooling cost measures that earlier
studies have deemed to be important predictors of educational attainment (see, e.g.
Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Cameron and Taber, 2004). A detailed description of
these variables is presented in Appendix 1.A. Columns (II) and (III) of Table 1.2
report the averages for constrained and unconstrained subsamples, with a t-statistics
for the differences in Column (IV). It appears that constrained youths are more likely
than the unconstrained to be financially disadvantaged. More specifically, constrained
youths are more likely to come from larger families and have lower parental incomes.
Parental income of constrained youths is $20,500 a year versus $23,800 a year for
unconstrained youths (in 1979 dollars). Constrained youths are also more likely to
be of Hispanic ethnicity.12 At the same time, parental education and average AFQT
ability test scores are lower for constrained relative to unconstrained youths. This re-
sults suggests lower college readiness and possibly lower expected returns to education
among the constrained.
To evaluate how my measure covary with the characteristics deemed to be
the important correlates of educational attainment (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002),
it is instructive to examine the interactions of my constraints indicator with ability
and parental income. One would expect that “smart poor” youths are more likely
to report constraints in education than “dumb rich” youths. To see if this pattern
exists, Figure 1.1 presents the proportion of constrained youths by parental income
and tercile on the AFQT test. It shows that 17 percent of high-ability youths from
12The results in Jappelli (1990) show that lower income and ethnic or racial minority status are
positively correlated with liquidity constraints.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of Credit Constraints over Parental Income and AFQT Ter-
cile, NLSY79
the lowest income tercile report financial difficulties versus only 12 percent of low-
ability youths from the highest income tercile.13 Moreover, there is a strict ordering
by parental income among the youths in the top AFQT tercile: high-income youths
are significantly less likely to report constraints than low-income youths.
The results in this section indicate that although my measure of constraints is
noisy and not precise, it appears to capture some information correlated with both
financial constraints and educational choices.
13This difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level (t = 1.733). Data and standard
errors are reported in Table 1.B-1 in Appendix 1.B. Appendix 1.B also presents some additional
evidence that high-ability poor youths are more likely to report constraints than low-ability rich
youths.
15
1.4 Probability of Reporting Constraints
What distinguishes individuals who report financial constraints in education from
those who do not? A major factor may be parental resources. Individuals from
lower-income families with more siblings would be more likely to perceive themselves
as constrained. Because an opportunity to live at home can substantially reduce
schooling costs (see, e.g., Cameron and Taber, 2004), those living in the vicinity of
a public two- or four-year college would be less likely to report constraints. Family
background might matter as well, as it shapes preferences for education. At the
same time, if individuals with lower net benefits to education are likely to over-report
constraints, these intuitive correlations may not necessarily be observed in the data.
This section presents descriptive regression estimates of the probability of reporting
constraints, conditional on individual, local, and family background characteristics.
The results indicate that, for men, subjective constraints appear to be driven by the
opportunity costs of schooling. For women, subjective constraints are correlated with
demographic and socioeconomic factors in a way consistent with the presence of credit
constraints. The estimates can be interpreted as partial correlations and do not bear
causal interpretation.
Coefficients and marginal effects from the logistic regression estimates of fi-
nancial constraints probability are presented in Table 1.3. Higher parental income is
correlated with lower probability of reporting financial constraints for both men and
women. Youths in the top quartile of the distribution of parental income have a 4
percentage-point (30 percent) lower probability of reporting constraints than youths
in the bottom quartile. Similarly, living in a county with a two- or a four-year public
college or university is correlated with a lower constraints probability. A nearby pub-
16
Table 1.3: Estimated Probability of Reporting Financial Constraints
Men Women
(I) (II)
Coeff. Marg. Ef-
fects
Coeff. Marg. Ef-
fects
Black -0.316* -0.033* -0.101 -0.010
(0.174) (0.017) (0.178) (0.018)
Hispanic -0.317 -0.032* 0.432** 0.051**
(0.203) (0.019) (0.182) (0.024)
Number of siblings 0.045** 0.005** -0.015 -0.002
(0.023) (0.003) (0.026) (0.003)
Mother’s education -0.001 -0.000 -0.048 -0.005
(0.026) (0.003) (0.031) (0.003)
Father’s education -0.024 -0.003 0.015 0.002
(0.020) (0.002) (0.021) (0.002)
Both parents -0.075 -0.008 0.120 0.012
(0.152) (0.017) (0.143) (0.014)
Urban residence 0.037 0.004 -0.563*** -0.066***
(0.203) (0.022) (0.162) (0.021)
Local college -0.329 -0.033* -0.508*** -0.047***
(0.205) (0.019) (0.193) (0.016)
Avg. tuition/1,000 -0.177 -0.019 -0.112 -0.012
(0.211) (0.023) (0.230) (0.024)
AFQT Q2 0.045 0.005 0.356** 0.040*
(0.145) (0.016) (0.181) (0.022)
AFQT Q3 -0.076 -0.008 0.165 0.018
(0.178) (0.019) (0.204) (0.023)
AFQT Q4 -0.384* -0.039** 0.388* 0.044*
(0.199) (0.019) (0.223) (0.027)
Income Q2 -0.205 -0.022 0.049 0.005
(0.159) (0.016) (0.171) (0.018)
Income Q3 -0.078 -0.008 -0.341* -0.034*
(0.197) (0.021) (0.189) (0.018)
Income Q4 -0.382* -0.039** -0.384** -0.037**
(0.206) (0.020) (0.189) (0.017)
Constant -1.122*** -1.486***
(0.432) (0.403)
Log likelihood -988 -952
Pseudo R2 0.025 0.024
N 2,595 2,569
Notes: a) For binary variables marginal effects are estimated for changes from zero to one.
b) Additional controls include cohort indicators and indicators for residence in the four census
regions. c) Wald test rejects the hypothesis of equal coefficients for men and women: χ2 = 38.62***.
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lic college is associated with a 3 percentage-point (or a 25 percent) lower probability
for men and a 5 percentage-point (or a 36 percent) lower probability for women.
The regressions are estimated separately for men and women because, as Ta-
ble 1.1 indicates, there appear to be some important gender differences in reporting
obstacles to desired education. The results in Table 1.3 offer further evidence to this
extent: a joint Wald test indicates that the coefficients are different across the two
equations. Conditional on family income and other individual and local characteris-
tics, AFQT test scores have a negative correlation with the probability of reporting
constraints for men and positive - for women. Relative to the lowest quartile of the
ability distribution, the highest quartile is associated with a 4 percentage-point lower
probability of reporting constraints for men. Because men are more likely to report
the need to work, this result implies a negative correlation between the constraints
probability and the opportunity costs of schooling. For women, by contrast, being
in the highest quartile of the ability distribution is associated with a 4 percentage-
point higher probability of reporting constraints. This result is potentially consistent
with the evidence in earlier studies, indicating that men’s college attendance de-
cisions may be more heavily influenced by competing opportunities than women’s
attendance decisions (Averett and Burton, 1996). Moreover, for men, minority status
(black or Hispanic) for men is negatively correlated with the probability of reporting
constraints, conditional on parental background and AFQT test scores.
For women, the results in Table 1.3 are similar to the estimates of liquidity
constraints probabilities in Jappelli (1990). Hispanic ethnicity is associated with a
5.1 percentage-points higher probability of reporting constraints for women in my
sample. Similarly, Jappelli (1990) estimated that being white is associated with a 5.4
percentage-point lower probability of constraints. Living in an urban area is asso-
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ciated with a 6.6 percentage-point lower probability of constraints for women in my
sample and with a 4.9 percentage-point lower probability in Jappelli (1990).
To check if gender differences in the results are driven solely by the differences
in reporting the “need to work”, I estimate the probability of reporting “financial
reasons” only. The marginal effects from these regressions are presented in Table
1.B-4 in Appendix 1.B. A Wald χ2 test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients
are the same for men and women at a 5-percent level (χ2 = 31.45**), which implies
that gender differences are robust to exclusion of the “need to work” answer from the
definition of constraints. To make the results comparable with the estimates in my
second chapter, Column (I) of Table 1.B-4 presents combined estimates for men and
women. Similar to Jappelli and the results in the second chapter, Hispanic ethnicity
is positively correlated and high parental income is negatively correlated with the
probability of reporting financial difficulties.
Conditional on parental income and ability test scores, parental education and
presence of a father in the household during adolescence are not significantly corre-
lated with the constraints probability in neither Table 1.3 nor Table 1.B-4. Overall,
poor fit of the model and low statistical significance of a large number of the coeffi-
cients provides further indication that my measure of constraints is quite noisy.
1.5 Financial Constraints and Educational Attainment
Conditional on scholastic ability, parental income, and family background character-
istics, is there a significant negative correlation between my subjective measure of
constraints and educational outcomes? Economic theory suggests that college enroll-
ment probability has a negative relationship with credit constraints and a positive
relationship with the net benefits of schooling. The results earlier in the paper suggest
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that my measure of constraints captures low net benefits of schooling for men, but not
for women. Hence, we can expect a stronger negative correlation between education
and my measure of constraints for men than for women. In this section, I examine
a number of dimensions of college education in a standard regression framework. I
augment regression specifications similar to those used by Carneiro and Heckman
(2002) with my financial constraints indicator. While this exercise is purely descrip-
tive, the results accord with my expectations and provides further insights into the
information content of my measure.14
Table 1.4 reports marginal effects from a logistic regression of college enrollment
probability at age 21. Column I presents the baseline specification with controls for
parental income, ability test scores, family background, and demographic characteris-
tics similar to Carneiro and Heckman (2002). In Column II, the baseline specification
is augmented with the financial constraints indicator. The indicator appears to be
an important correlate of college enrollment. Subjective constraints are associated
with a 4 percentage-point lower probability of being enrolled in college at age 21.
In Column III, an interaction between the constraints indicator and the gender bi-
nary is included. Although not statistically significant at the conventional levels, the
interaction term indicates that financial constraints have a positive correlation with
college enrollment for women. For men, financial constraints are associated with a 7
percentage-point lower enrollment probability.
Other controls have the signs and magnitudes consistent with the earlier stud-
ies (e.g. Belley and Lochner, 2007). The college enrollment probability is positively
correlated with ability, parental income, and parental education, and negatively corre-
14It is important to note that my measure of financial constraints incorporates expectations of
future educational attainment, which depends on current and future choices. This implies that in a
regression model of educational outcomes my measure is potentially endogenous. This is why it is
necessary to emphasize that the results below need to be interpreted as partial correlations and do
not bear a causal interpretation.
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Table 1.4: Estimated Probability of College Enrollment at Age 21
Specification
(I) (II) (III)
Female 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.061***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Black 0.313*** 0.312*** 0.312***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Hispanic 0.228*** 0.230*** 0.229***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Both parents 0.028 0.027 0.027
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Mother’s education 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Father’s education 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of siblings -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
South 0.053** 0.053** 0.053**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Urban residence 0.019 0.019 0.019
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
AFQT Q2 0.278*** 0.280*** 0.280***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
AFQT Q3 0.441*** 0.442*** 0.441***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
AFQT Q4 0.702*** 0.702*** 0.701***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Income Q2 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.103***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Income Q3 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.096***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Income Q4 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.170***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Constrained -0.039* -0.066**
(0.020) (0.026)
Female*Constrained 0.059
(0.046)
Pseudo R2 0.274 0.274 0.274
Log likelihood -2,374 -2,372 -2,371
LR test χ2(1)=3.62* χ2(2)=5.34*
Notes: a) The table reports marginal effects with standard errors in parenthesis.
b) Additional controls include cohort indicators. c) Number of observations N=5,164.
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lated with family size. Conditional on ability, parental income, and family background
characteristics, blacks and Hispanics have a higher probability of college enrollment
than whites. Introducing the financial constraints indicator in Column II does not
change the magnitudes and statistical significance of these coefficients, indicating ro-
bustness of the model. At the same time, the results of a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test
show that the model fit is significantly improved by introducing the indicator and its
interactions with the gender variable.
The strong correlation between college enrollment probability and my mea-
sure of constraints for men but not for women is consistent with the idea that the
constraints indicator capture high opportunity costs for men. What about other di-
mensions of education? Carneiro and Heckman, for example, have argued that credit
constraints may have an impact on schooling decisions at a number of margins, such
as quality of the university and timing of enrollment. For this study, it is especially
important to examine an array of schooling dimensions to evaluate the information
content of my measure.
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 present conditional and unconditional gaps in educational
outcomes by financial constraints, separately for men and women. Conditional gaps
are marginal effects from logistic regressions of outcomes on the same variables as
in Column II of Table 1.4.15 In addition to college enrollment, I examine five other
dimensions of education, expressed as binary outcomes. Two binary variables cap-
ture educational attainment: an indicator for completing a four-year degree and an
indicator for completing a two-year degree (for those who do not complete a four-year
degree). Educational attainment is the highest degree completed through the 1994
wave of the survey, conducted when respondents were between the ages of 39 and 43
and had completed the bulk of their schooling. For those with at least a two-year
15The full regression results are available from the author upon request.
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Table 1.5: Gaps in Education by Subjective Constraints, Men
Total Bottom AFQT Middle AFQT Top AFQT
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond.
Panel A - Enrollment in College at Age 21
-0.112*** -0.076*** -0.026 -0.019 -0.035 -0.009 -0.180*** -0.173***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.016) (0.041) (0.042) (0.056) (0.063)
Panel B - Completion of a 4-Year College
-0.097*** -0.054*** -0.010 -0.019 -0.070** * -0.047*** -0.121** -0.100*
(0.022) (0.015) (0.009) (0.006) (0.028) (0.019) (0.057) (0.058)
Panel C - Completion of a 2-Year College
-0.047** -0.032* -0.018 -0.013 -0.028 -0.024 -0.069 -0.051
(0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.010) (0.033) (0.027) (0.050) (0.049)
Panel D - No Delay in College Enrollment
-0.110*** -0.085* -0.139* -0.089 -0.063 -0.074 -0.093* -0.045
(0.042) (0.048) (0.083) (0.089) (0.070) (0.079) (0.055) (0.068)
Panel E - Enrollment in a 4-Year versus 2-Year College
-0.065 -0.056 0.021 0.009 -0.046 -0.023 -0.086 -0.084
(0.046) (0.048) (0.071) (0.074) (0.082) (0.088) (0.081) (0.090)
Panel F - Enrollment in a Competitive College
-0.062 -0.038 0.077 0.062 -0.082 -0.034 -0.162* -0.160*
(0.043) (0.043) (0.059) (0.059) (0.074) (0.074) (0.094) (0.095)
Notes: a) Standard errors in parenthesis. b) All results are presented relative to the uncon-
strained men. c) Conditional gaps are marginal effects from logit regressions.
degree, another binary indicates whether the degree was received without a delay, i.e.
the respondent had completed at least one year of college education by the age 21.
Quality of education is captured by two indicators: enrollment in a four-year versus a
two-year college, and enrollment in a college with competitive admissions standards.
While the other measures have been previously examined by Carneiro and Heckman,
the indicator for competitive admissions standards is unique to this study. I define a
college or university as competitive if it collected and reported average SAT or ACT
scores of incoming freshmen in the 1983-1984 school year.
Table 1.5 shows substantial differences between constrained and unconstrained
men along most of schooling dimensions. Column I (“Total”) presents the estimates
for all men. All the unconditional gaps, except for the gaps in quality, appear sizable
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Table 1.6: Gaps in Education by Subjective Constraints, Women
Total Bottom AFQT Middle AFQT Top AFQT
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond.
Panel A - Enrollment in College at Age 21
-0.018 0.011 0.027 0.047 -0.041 -0.048 -0.037 0.033
(0.028) (0.030) (0.035) (0.034) (0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.053)
Panel B - Completion of a 4-Year College
-0.037 0.012 0.033 0.015 -0.013 -0.004 -0.129*** -0.085
(0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.033) (0.028) (0.051) 0.054
Panel C - Completion of a 2-Year College
0.005 0.013 0.012 0.035 -0.013 -0.007 -0.017 -0.012
(0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.029) (0.042) (0.038) (0.049) (0.051)
Panel D - No Delay in College Enrollment
-0.061* -0.026 -0.044 -0.015 -0.105** -0.079 -0.013 0.018
(0.034) (0.031) (0.067) (0.064) (0.054) (0.058) (0.047) (0.028)
Panel E - Enrollment in a 4-Year versus 2-Year College
-0.103*** -0.088** -0.066 -0.066 -0.159** -0.165** -0.099* -0.057
(0.039) (0.042) (0.066) (0.065) (0.072) (0.072) (0.060) (0.065)
Panel F - Enrollment in a Competitive College
0.042 0.074 0.043 0.055 0.083 0.096 0.003 0.055
(0.036) (0.040) (0.052) (0.055) (0.064) (0.072) (0.067) (0.076)
Notes: a) Standard errors in parenthesis. b) All results are presented relative to the uncon-
strained women. c) Conditional gaps are marginal effects from logit regressions.
and are statistically significant, varying between 5 and 11 percentage-points. This
result is again consistent with the idea that my measure of constraints captures low
net benefits to college education for men. It seems intuitive, that opportunity costs
would have a stronger influence on whether or not to enroll in college than on what
college to enroll in.
Men who report credit constraints have lower unconditional probabilities of
receiving a two-year or a four-year degree and a higher unconditional probability
of delaying enrollment. The conditional gaps, adjusted for parental income and
background characteristics are smaller in magnitude, but remain statistically sig-
nificant. Self-reported financial constraints are associated with a 5 percentage-point
lower probability of a four-year degree completion rate and a 3 percentage-point lower
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probability of a two-year degree completion rate. They are also associated with a 9
percentage-point higher probability of delaying college enrollment, for those with at
least a two-year degree.
The rest of Table 1.5 presents the gaps estimated by the AFQT terciles.
Scholastic ability, captured by the AFQT scores is an important correlate of ed-
ucational attainment (see, e.g., Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Belley and Lochner,
2007). Because it captures both college readiness and future benefits to education,
among others, the demand for education is usually higher for the high-ability individ-
uals. At the same time, higher ability test scores may imply higher opportunity costs
of education. Hence it is not surprising that the gaps in college outcomes are the
most pronounced at the top of the AFQT distribution. There are large and signifi-
cant unconditional gaps in college enrollment, completion, and quality for high-ability
men. High-ability men who report constraints are 18 percentage-points less likely to
enroll in college at age 21 and 9 percentage-points more likely to delay if they do
enroll. They are also 12 percentage-points less likely to complete a four-year degree
and 16 percentage-points less likely to enroll in a competitive college or university.
Controlling for parental income, individual, and family background characteristics
does not eliminate the gaps in college enrollment and quality (but does eliminate the
gap in delays). The persistence of these gaps and the results presented earlier in this
paper imply that my constraints indicator reveals important information about the
relationship between educational choices and the opportunity costs for men, beyond
that captured by the standard parental income and ability measures.
For women the picture is very different. The first column of Table 1.6 shows
that, conditional on parental income and family background characteristics, financial
constraints are significantly correlated only with the probability of a four-year versus
a two-year college enrollment. Constraints are associated with a 9 percentage-point
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difference in this outcome. Examined separately by the AFQT terciles, constraints are
associated with a 17 percentage-point lower probability of a four-year versus a two-
year college enrollment for women in the middle of the distribution. These results
indicate that my measure of financial constraints is not an important correlate of
educational choices for women, other than those on the quality margin.
1.6 Conclusions
This study investigates the use of subjective assessment of financial difficulties in edu-
cation as a potentially more direct way to point out credit-constrained students in the
widely used NLSY79 data set. Using the information on educational expectations and
aspirations, I develop an indicator of constraints and examine its correlations with re-
spondent’s individual, family background, and socioeconomic characteristics. About
12 percent of college-age youths in the NLSY79 consider themselves financially con-
strained in educational choices. Because of synthetic nature of my indicator and the
specific features of survey design, this is not a reliable estimate of the fraction of
credit-constrained students in the United States. By construction, it is more likely
to capture those with high opportunity costs and low benefits of college education.
However, the indicator appears to capture some important aspects of heterogeneity in
educational outcomes, not revealed by the standard socioeconomic indicators. More-
over, it indicates that net financial benefits of schooling have a stronger correlation
with educational decision of men relative to women.
On a broader scale, the results in this paper suggest that although subjective
assessments of constraints need to be treated with caution, they exhibit potential as a
valuable source of information regarding individual decision-making. Subjective mea-
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sures may allow researchers to observe additional aspects of population heterogeneity
that facilitate econometric analysis and reduce the need for economic assumptions.
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Chapter 1 Appendices
Appendix 1.A: Data
The NLSY79 is a longitudinal, nationally representative data set that oversamples
Hispanics, blacks, and white low-income individuals.16 The demographic characteris-
tics in my study are race/ethnicity, age, and gender. About 20 percent of individuals
in my sample are racial or ethnic minorities: 14 percent are black and 6 percent are
Hispanic (see Table 1.2 in the text). The average age of sample respondents is 19 years
old. Family background characteristics are parental income, parental education, and
number of siblings. Parental income is measured when the respondents were age 17
(or age 16 if not available at age 17). Mean parental income in the sample is $23,400
in 1979 dollars, which is equivalent to $66,700 in 2007 dollars. Parental education
is measured in years of schooling completed by the respondents’ mother and father.
The average level of parental education in the sample is high school.
In the NLSY79, scholastic ability is captured by the Armed Forces Qualification
Test (AFQT) scores. The AFQT scores have been widely used by social scientists
as a measure of cognitive ability and scholastic aptitude (see, e.g., Cawley et al.,
2000; Carneiro and Heckman, 2002). The score is a weighted average of the Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test results. The ASVAB measures
knowledge and skill in ten different academic and vocational areas. In this study I use
the combined AFQT test scores as well as the scores from the four separate sections
of the ASVAB test: math, word knowledge, science, and automotive ability. While
the AFQT scores measure general scholastic aptitude and trainability, the separate
test scores capture a wider range of specific abilities. Capturing specific abilities is
16The survey also includes 1,280 individuals who served in the military in 1978. This subsample
is excluded from the study because of the age restriction I impose.
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important since they are associated with different areas of competitive advantage
in the labor markets. A young person with higher automotive scores may have a
stronger potential as a plumber than as a lawyer, whereas higher word knowledge
scores indicate the opposite. Students in the sample took the test in the summer of
1980, when they were between 15 and 18 years old. The averages of the raw scores
are presented in the first column of Table 1.2.
Local characteristics include state public tuition costs, presence of a two- or
a four-year public college or university in the county of residence, binary variables
for Census geographic regions, and a binary variable for residence in a metropolitan
statistical area. Variables for state public tuition costs and presence of a college in
the vicinity are created using the data from the Department of Education’s Higher
Education General Information Survey (HEGIS). The HEGIS data was merged to the
NLSY79 using the Geocodes restricted-access state and county identifiers. Geocodes
data contain sensitive information that makes it possible to identify individual respon-
dents. To ensure confidentiality, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) only grants
access to Geocodes data to researchers in the United States who agree to adhere
to the BLS confidentiality policy. To gain access to the data, an application must
be submitted to the BLS describing the project’s goals, methodology, and security
policies to protect the data.
The Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) was designed to
provide comprehensive information on various aspects of post-secondary education in
the United States. The study domain includes all post-secondary institutions oper-
ating in the United States and its territories. The data used in this paper come from
the Institutional Characteristics module. The module contains annual data on type
of institution, tuition, location, and other characteristics of colleges and universities
in the United States. The study excludes federal institutions and colleges with enroll-
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ment of fewer than 100 students. The data are available from University of Michigan
data repository, and can be accessed at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/IAED-
SERIES/00030.xml?token=6.
Table 1.2 in the text shows that about 87 percent of individuals live in a county
with a two- or a four-year accredited college nearby. Average public university tuition
varies substantially across the states: from $365 per-year in Washington, D.C., to
above $2,000 in Vermont, with a sample mean of about $1,100, in 1979 dollars.
Appendix 1.B: Proportion of Constrained by Parental Income and AFQT
Scores
Tables 1.B-2 and 1.B-3 present the distribution of financial difficulties by income
and ability terciles by educational aspirations groups. Similar to Figure 1.1 in the
text, high-ability youths from the lowers income tercile are significantly more likely
to report financial difficulties than low-ability youths from the highest income tercile.
Among the youths who aspire to receive some college education this difference is
14 percentage-points (significant at ten-percent level, t = 1.743), and among the
youths who aspire to receive a college degree or more education this difference is 8
percentage-points (significant at ten-percent level, t = 1.739). Moreover among the
high-ability youths, those from low-income families are more likely to report credit
constraints than those from high-income families. At the same time, there are no
significant patterns across the ability distribution, conditional on income.
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Table 1.B-1: Proportion Constrained by Parental Income and AFQT Terciles
Parental Income Diff. T-stats.
AFQT Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1-Q3
Q1 0.134 0.148 0.117 0.017 0.737
Q2 0.158 0.136 0.128 0.030 1.405
Q3 0.167 0.122 0.087 0.079 3.953***
Diff. Q3-Q1 0.033 -0.027 -0.030
T-stats. 1.421 1.262 1.497
Notes: Testing the hypothesis of proportion of constrained in first and third
terciles of the income/ability distribution: *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.10
Table 1.B-2: Proportion Constrained by Parental Income and AFQT Terciles. Ex-
pected Education: Some College
Parental Income Diff. T-stats.
AFQT Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1-Q3
Q1 0.259 0.224 0.193 0.066 0.950
Q2 0.267 0.239 0.220 0.047 0.881
Q3 0.333 0.213 0.220 0.113 1.739*
Diff. Q3-Q1 0.074 -0.011 0.027
T-stats. 1.031 0.181 0.423
Note: Testing the hypothesis of proportion of constrained in first and third
terciles of the income/ability distribution: *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.10
Table 1.B-3: Proportion Constrained by Parental Income and AFQT Terciles. Ex-
pected Education: College or More
Parental Income Diff. T-stats.
AFQT Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1-Q3
Q1 0.057 0.047 0.035 0.022 0.603
Q1 0.056 0.056 0.045 0.010 0.408
Q1 0.113 0.085 0.049 0.064 2.980***
Diff. Q3-Q1 0.056 0.039 0.014
T-stats. 1.559 1.179 0.468
Note: Testing the hypothesis of proportion of constrained in first and third
terciles of the income/ability distribution: *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.10
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Table 1.B-4: Estimated Probability of Reporting Financial Reasons Only
Men Women All
(I) (II) (III)
Black 0.015 0.002 0.012
(0.016) (0.017) (0.012)
Hispanic -0.011 0.063*** 0.025*
(0.017) (0.023) (0.015)
Number of siblings 0.005** -0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Father’s education 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Both parents -0.006 0.009 0.003
(0.014) (0.013) (0.010)
Urban residence 0.004 -0.048*** -0.023
(0.018) (0.018) (0.014)
Local college -0.019 -0.032** -0.027**
(0.018) (0.015) (0.013)
Avg. tuition/1,000 -0.011 0.017 0.004
(0.022) (0.021) (0.016)
AFQT Q2 0.022 0.046** 0.032**
(0.014) (0.020) (0.013)
AFQT Q3 0.022 0.028 0.023
(0.018) (0.021) (0.014)
AFQT Q4 0.011 0.049* 0.026*
(0.019) (0.025) (0.015)
Income Q2 -0.010 0.012 0.002
(0.014) (0.017) (0.011)
Income Q3 -0.008 -0.017 -0.011
(0.017) (0.017) (0.012)
Income Q4 -0.029* -0.023 -0.025**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.011)
Female 0.011
(0.008)
Log likelihood -755 -821 -1,592
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.022 0.012
N 2,595 2,569 5,164
Notes: a) For binary variables marginal effects are estimated for changes from zero to one.
b) Includes cohort indicators and indicators for residence in the four census regions.
c)A Wald test rejects the hypothesis of equal coefficients for men and women: χ2 = 31.45**.
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Chapter 2
Parental Liquidity Constraints and Children’s Education: Evidence from
the Children of Young Mothers
2.1 Introduction
What fraction of college-age youths in the United States comes from liquidity-constrained
families? Are they more likely to be liquidity-constrained themselves? Do youths from
these families receive less education than youths from unconstrained families? If such
gaps in education exist, do they disappear when controls for scholastic ability and
family background characteristics are introduced?
These questions are important because youths from liquidity-constrained fam-
ilies may have difficulties borrowing for college and be less likely to enroll or graduate
with a college degree. When college costs are potentially much greater than subsidized
student loan limits, parental resources and ability to borrow become an increasingly
important source of education financing. While college costs have been rising steadily
over the past two decades, the real-dollar value of student borrowing limits under the
Federal subsidized loan program (Stafford Loan Program) has declined. Tuition and
fees at four-year public institutions more than doubled in real terms between 1982
and 2002 (College Board, 2008b).1 Over the same time period, borrowing limits on
Stafford loans rose only slightly in nominal terms.2 As a result, the ratio of first-year
loan limits to the average published tuition and fees at a four-year public institution
declined from 2.5 in 1982 to less than 0.6 in 2002. Consistent with these trends, more
1In 1982 tuition and fees at a four-year public institution were $2,194 a year versus $4,715 a year
in 2002 (in 2007 dollars).
2Prior to 1986, dependent college students were able to borrow up to $2,500 per year in Stafford
loans. By 2002 this limit was increased to $2,625 for first-year students, $3,500 for second-year
students, and $5,500 for third- to fifth-year students.
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than half of all college students borrowed up to the Federal limit in 1999, relative to
only 18 percent in 1989 (Titus, 2002). Moreover, the demand for private educational
loans has increased dramatically over the past decade, as has parental borrowing for
children’s college education.3
While some evidence points towards the potential importance of credit con-
straints, most economic studies have come to the conclusion that they play only a
small part in shaping the demand for education.4 These studies, however, have relied
on indirect measures of constraints (e.g. parental income) and data from the 1980s.
Having recognized the need for more direct evidence, two recent papers, by Stine-
brickner and Stinebrickner (2008) and Sorokina (2009), have used subjective reports
regarding financial and borrowing difficulties to pinpoint potentially constrained stu-
dents and to evaluate the link between these constraints and educational attainment.
In a survey conducted specifically for this purpose, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner
(2008) denote as credit-constrained those students who would hypothetically want to
borrow money if offered a loan at a “fair interest rate”. The authors then examine
the relationship between these self-reported credit constraints and drop-out decisions
of students at a small private four-year college.5 They conclude that most college
attrition in their data is unrelated to inability to borrow.
In a recent paper, Sorokina (2009) has used the gaps between educational as-
pirations and expectations resulting from subjective financial difficulties to point out
potentially constrained youths among the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
3Nonfederal student loans increased from 7 percent of all education loans in 1997-98 to 24 percent
in 2006-2007. Federal PLUS loans to parents increased from 9 percent to 13 percent over the same
time period. In 2006-2007 over 19 billion dollars were awarded in nonfederal student loans and 10.5
billion dollars in Federal PLUS loans (College Board, 2008a).
4See Sorokina (2009) for a detailed overview of these studies.
5Berea College, that Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner draw their data from, is a private four-
year college in Kentucky with a mission of providing an education to students from low-income
backgrounds. It is unique in offering full tuition and room/board subsidy to all incoming students.
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(NLSY79) respondents who were between the ages of 17 and 21 in 1982. The author
shows that self-reported financial difficulties are an important correlate of educational
decisions, but warns that it is a noisy measure. Because the survey questions are not
precisely formulated, it is hard to interpret whether “financial difficulties” refer to an
inability to borrow or low expected net returns to college education. In the latter case,
making loans available to prospective college students would not necessarily change
their schooling decisions. Moreover, the measure Sorokina develops is likely to be
affected by justification bias, if, for example, low-ability individuals report financial
difficulties to justify their interest in college education. Having acknowledged these
possible drawbacks, the author concludes that her subjective measure provides only
an imprecise estimate of the fraction of credit-constrained in the data.
This paper contributes to the literature seeking to evaluate the proportion of
credit-constrained students in the United States. Using the self-reported borrowing
limitations of parents, I construct an indicator of constraints and examine correlations
and partial correlations between this indicator and the educational attainment of
young adults. I depart from the earlier studies in two important ways. First, I
employ a direct measure of borrowing limitations that has earned some credibility in
the economics literature. Following Jappelli (1990), I denote as liquidity-constrained
those families where either parent has been denied credit in the recent past or has not
applied for credit because of fear of being rejected. This definition is straightforward
because it explicitly refers to an event in a respondent’s past. It does not involve
invoking hypothetical scenarios or making inferences about the future, and hence
minimizes the possibility of misinterpretation by either the respondent or the analyst.
Unfortunately, this indicator has one important draw-back that I discuss in more
detail later in this paper. It that it does not distinguish between the individuals who
face supply-side constraint and those who simply with to borrow more than they
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could repay. However, since borrowing difficulties are reported by parents and not by
students themselves, it eliminates the possibility that respondents report constraints
to justify their lack of interest in college education that is due to other reasons, such
as, for example, low scholastic aptitude (i.e. justification bias).
Second, I examine correlations between parental-reported liquidity constraints
and children’s college enrollment probabilities and tuition and fees for those enrolled.
While educational expenditures is an important margin of college choice, because
of lack of data they have been largely ignored by earlier studies. The information
available from the NLSY79 Young Adult Supplement allows me to compare tuition
and fees that students from constrained and unconstrained families report.
I focus on U.S. youths who were making their post-secondary education deci-
sions in the early 2000s. Examining recent evidence is important because most studies
of credit constraints in education have been based on the NLSY79 data from the early
1980s, while liquidity constraints have possibly become more binding over the past two
decades (see, e.g., Belley and Lochner, 2007).6 My data include children of NLSY79
women who were born between 1978 and 1985. These are children of relatively young
mothers, who are more likely to be black or Hispanic or to be disadvantaged eco-
nomically. This is a group that might benefit most from policy interventions and
hence are of particular interest to policy-makers. Using the full NLSY79 sample, I
also evaluate the fraction of U.S. families with self-reported liquidity constraints and
the proportion of U.S. children in such families.
My results indicate that about 21 percent of young adults in the sample and
about 18 percent of children nationwide come from families with self-reported liquidity
constraints. Young adults from liquidity-constrained families have lower high school
6The list of studies using the NLSY79 that did not find credit constraints to be important
include Cameron and Heckman (1998), Keane and Wolpin (2001), Carneiro and Heckman (2002),
and Cameron and Taber (2004).
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graduation and college enrollment rates, and are more likely to study in less expensive
colleges and universities than young adults from unconstrained families. Controlling
for scholastic ability, parental income, and family background characteristics, parental
liquidity constraints are associated with an about 16-percent lower probability of
completing at least one year of college education. This negative correlation is even
stronger for young adults at the top of the scholastic ability distribution. At the
same time, correlations between parental liquidity-constraints and the probability of
high school or college graduation are substantially weakened by conditioning on ability
and parental income. The same is true of the correlation between parental constraints
and self-reported tuition and fees of college students in the sample. Constrained and
unconstrained students with similar ability and parental income attend educational
institutions with similar levels of published tuition and fees. Performing this analysis
separately by parental wealth to control for higher credit risks associated with low
collateral does not significantly alter these results.
The issue of credit constraints in education has been of great interest to
economists because of the slow increase in the supply of skilled labor relative to
demand over the past few decades (Kane, 2007). My paper shows that a substantial
proportion of college-age adults come from families with self-reported borrowing lim-
itations. Moreover, there is a strong negative correlation between college enrollment
and parental credit access. At the same time, my paper is purely descriptive and does
not distinguish between alternative reasons for borrowing limitations or the observed
correlations. While borrowing limitations may result from a market failure, they can
also indicate a desire to increase consumption above feasible levels. The correlations
between borrowing limitations and educational attainment may, in turn, reflect lower
non-cognitive skills of children from such families. To sort between possible explana-
tions and identify a causal link between liquidity constraints and education, explicit
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modeling is required, which is beyond the scope of this paper. At the same time, the
findings that I present indicate that direct survey measures of liquidity constraints
may provide important insights into people’s educational choices.
2.2 Data and Operational Definitions
Who are the young adults in my study and what are their individual and family back-
ground characteristics? What demographic and socioeconomic factors are correlated
with parental assessments of borrowing limitations?7 Answering these questions can
help gauge the fraction of potentially constrained students in the United States.
In the first part of this section I present a conceptual and an operational defi-
nitions of credit constraints. According to my operational definition, over twenty per-
cent of mothers in the sample can be classified as credit-constrained. Unfortunately,
because binding credit constraints arise as a combination of supply and demand con-
ditions, it is impossible to determine whether individuals who report constraints are
credit-rationed or simply desire to live beyond their means. With this consideration
in mind I examine the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of mothers in
the sample and their correlation with the probability of reporting constraints. Sim-
ilarly to Jappelli (1990), I find that minority mothers and mothers with lower net
worth are more likely to be liquidity-constrained.
In the second part of the section I focus on children of the NLSY79 mothers.
To see how likely they are to be liquidity-constrained themselves, I compare the char-
acteristics of youths from constrained families to those of youths from unconstrained
families. In terms of socioeconomic background, youths from constrained families
have lower parental resources and are more likely to come from bigger urban families.
7Throughout the paper I use the words credit constraints and borrowing limitations synonymously
with liquidity constraints, as does much of the related literature.
42
Overall, it appears that the two sub-samples differ in a way that is consistent with the
presence of liquidity constraints. At the same time, youths from constrained families
also have significantly lower high school graduation and college enrollment rates. This
section indicates a possible correlation between parental liquidity-constraints and chil-
dren’s educational attainment that warrants closer investigation. It sets the stage for
a multivariate analysis of educational attainment of constrained and unconstrained
youths.
For my study, I use data from the NLSY79 and its Young Adult Supplement.
Economists have widely relied on the NLSY79 to study human capital investment,
because, unlike most other nationally representative surveys, it contains measures of
scholastic ability and detailed family background information. Extensive educational
and work histories of respondents, collected over 25 years, make it a particularly
attractive source of data for the analysis of educational choices and outcomes. Hence,
it is not surprising that most evidence on the role of credit constraints in shaping the
demand for education in the United States is based on these data. My descriptive
study pioneers an alternative use of the NLSY79 to evaluate the pervasiveness of
credit constraints. I utilize the later survey waves as a source of information on
parental income, background characteristics, and subjective borrowing difficulties. I
combine this information with data from the Young Adult Supplement to examine
the educational decisions of college-age youths in the early 2000s.
The analysis sample includes children who were born to the NLSY79 women
between 1978 and 1985 and were surveyed separately by the Young Adult Supplement
starting in 1994. In 2006, the most recent wave of the survey, these young men and
women were between the ages of 21 and 28. There are 2,995 such children in the
data.8 Merging records from the Young Adult Supplement to the original NLSY79
8The oldest children of the NLSY79 cohort were born in 1970. I exclude 471 children who were
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survey provides information on parental education, marital history, income, wealth,
and subjective borrowing limitations. From the analysis sample I exclude 288 young
adults (10.6 percent) with missing parental information. The final sample includes
2,707 young adults born to 1,842 NLSY79 women.
2.2.1 Credit Constraints
Conceptually, credit constraints are capital market imperfections that may have sig-
nificant negative impacts on income and welfare, especially for poor households.
Credit constraints may prevent individuals from enrolling in college, even if the net
present value of education is greater than the total costs.9
Approaches to determining which households are credit-constrained fall into
one of two categories: indirect methods, based on tests of a theoretical model involv-
ing credit constraints, and direct methods, using responses to qualitative questions
about credit-constraints collected in surveys. The direct survey method is appeal-
ing because it potentially provides a simple, unambiguous method for eliciting credit
constraints. In this paper I follow the definition first introduced by Jappelli (1990)
and denote two groups of respondents as credit-constrained: rejected borrowers and
“discouraged” applicants. Rejected borrowers are those individuals who answer “yes”
to the question: “In the past 5 years, has a lender or a creditor turned down your
or your spouse/partner’s request for credit or not given you as much credit as you
applied for?” Because some individuals may not apply for credit because they expect
to be turned down, I also denote these discouraged borrowers as credit-constrained.
These are the respondents who answer “yes” to the question: “In the past 5
born prior to 1978, since the average age of their mothers at birth was 17 years old, which is highly
unrepresentative of the U.S. population.
9Moreover, in the presence of earnings uncertainty, credit constraints may indirectly reduce the
lifetime earnings of risk-averse individuals by making them less likely to pursue college education
(see, e.g., Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990).
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years, have you or your spouse/partner thought about applying for credit, but changed
your mind because you thought you might be turned down?” This definition is aimed
to pinpoint individuals whose demand for credit exceeds supply at current prices.
The proportion of rejected applicants among the sample mothers is 12 percent, while
9 percent can be classified as discouraged borrowers. Hence, 21 percent of mothers
in the sample can be denoted as credit-constrained according to this definition.
Following Jappelli (1990), credit constraints can be conceptualized by consider-
ing the individual’s budget constraint in the presence of credit markets. An individual
finances consumption Ct, in the period t out of income, Yt, and the returns on assets,
At, at a rate of return, r. If borrowing is possible, the amount by which consumption
can exceed income and asset returns is restricted to be no greater than the households
credit limit, Dt:
Ct − Yt − At(1 + r) 6 Dt. (2.1)
If at optimal levels of consumption the left-hand side of equation (2.1) exceeds the
credit limit Dt, the constraint is binding. This expression indicates that credit con-
straints are a combination of supply and demand conditions. On the supply side,
credit rationing may arise when lenders do not have enough information to correctly
assess individual credit-worthiness or the risk of default. As a result, they may set
a low credit limit relative to the individual’s credit demand and some credit-worthy
applicants will be rejected for credit.10 However, even if lenders are able to set credit
limits that correctly reflect individuals credit-worthiness and risk levels, some appli-
cants may be rejected because they demand more credit than they can possibly repay.
10Some borrowers may have no access to credit, because their perceived risk of default is so high
that there is no interest rate that lenders are allowed to charge at which their expected return is
positive.
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In this case, rejected applicants are not credit-constrained in the conventional sense,
because their excess demand for credit violates a lifetime budget constraint. Because
neither the credit-worthiness nor the desired consumption levels are observable, it is
not possible to determine whether rejected applicants are credit-constrained or have
excess demand for credit.
Some intuition about whether or not rejected applicants are credit-constrained
can be gained by examining the characteristics that are potentially correlated with
credit-worthiness and risk levels. The interpretation of this exercise is very limited,
however, because the same observable characteristics that are correlated with lenders
assessment of individual credit risks may be correlated with the demand for credit.
Moreover, because there is no information in the data about the credit amounts or
the purpose of credit for rejected applicants, it is impossible to determine whether
their demand for credit is excessive and violates the lifetime budget constraint.
The key financial and socio-demographic characteristics of sample mothers are
presented in Table 2.1. The first part of the table (All) presents a comparison of
average characteristics of all constrained and unconstrained mothers in the sample.
It shows that median family income of constrained mothers is about 40 percent lower
than the median income of unconstrained mothers ($36,000 vs. $59,000). Median
family assets of constrained mothers are less than one-tenth of the median family
assets of the unconstrained ($800 vs. $86,000). At the same time, about 15 percent
of constrained mothers have a net worth in excess of $10,000. Jappelli reports similar
findings. He explains the positive net worth of some constrained individuals by differ-
ences in consumption horizons. Since it is not clear whether rejected borrowers have
been denied credit for consumption or for durables purchase, it is possible that some of
them, for example those who are accumulating assets for down payment, have positive
net worth. Indeed, the proportion of homeownership among constrained mothers is
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only 52 percent, compared with 74 percent among unconstrained mothers. Table 2.1
also reveals that blacks, Hispanics, and single/divorced women are over-represented
among constrained mothers.
A very high proportion of constrained mothers, about 40 percent, have a history
of personal bankruptcy: a large proportion of rejected applicants and discouraged
borrowers among sample mothers had failed to meet their credit obligations in the
past. Bankruptcy history may limit the supply of credit by signaling to lenders a
high probability of future default and/or the tendency to borrow beyond ones means.
The proportion of respondents with a history of bankruptcy is more than two times
higher among constrained mothers than among the unconstrained. This suggests that
constrained mothers may indeed be more likely to live beyond their means.
Among the mothers who I denote as constrained, are those who do not apply
for credit because of the fear of being rejected less likely to want to live beyond their
means than rejected applicants? Intuitively this is not necessarily the case. When
there is a cost of applying for credit, there are two potential, not mutually exclusive
reasons why an individual may not apply. First, individuals who suspect to face
supply-side rationing because of, for example, low collateral or discrimination by race
or ethnicity may not apply. Second, some individuals may expect that their credit
demand would be perceived by lenders as an attempt to live beyond their means
because of, for example, low earnings.11 Hence, even if an individual wants to live
beyond their means, they may not apply for credit because of an expectation of being
rejected.
The second part of Table 2.1 (Constrained) presents the descriptive statistics
for rejected and discouraged applicants, with t-statistics for the difference reported
11Jappelli suggests a third possible explanation – some individuals may not apply both because
they expect to be turned down and because they would not want credit anyway.
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in the last column. This comparison indicates that discouraged applicants have sub-
stantially less collateral than rejected borrowers: their median net worth is less than
$200 versus $2,600 for rejected borrowers. The proportion of home-ownership is half
as high among discouraged as among rejected applicants. Moreover, the proportion
of single and Black women is substantially higher among discouraged borrowers.
Discouraged borrowers have lower incomes than rejected applicants, which indi-
cates that they may have difficulties repaying a loan if one is taken out. Median family
earnings of discouraged borrowers are less than half the earning of rejected applicants
($20,100 vs. $48,000 a year). Average education is also lower among discouraged
applicants, which may imply a lower earnings potential. These results suggest that
most discouraged borrowers have an accurate assessment of their credit-worthiness or
the probability of rejection. Had they applied, they would have probably been turned
down. At the same time, the proportion of individuals with a history of bankruptcy
is the same across the two sub-samples. Hence, from this comparison it is not clear
whether rejected borrowers are more likely to attempt living beyond their means than
the discouraged applicants.
To further explore the correlation between the demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics in Table 2.1 and the probability of facing borrowing difficulties, Col-
umn (I) of Table 2.B-1 in Appendix 2.B presents the results of a logistic regressions in
the spirit of Jappelli (1990). Overall, the results accord with his findings. While mar-
ried women are less likely to report liquidity constraints, black and Hispanic women
are more likely to do so. Older mothers have a lower probability of reporting con-
straints. Total family net worth (measured in logs) has a strong negative correlation
with the probability of reporting constraints. This result conforms to our economic
intuition. A higher net worth implies that a family has lower demand for credit, hold-
ing everything else constant. At the same time, higher net worth families are able
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to put up more collateral to securitize loans, which is associated with higher debt
ceilings. Table 2.B-1 shows that a one-percent increase in the net worth is associated
with a 4 percent increase in the constraints probability. At the same time, having a
history of bankruptcy is associated with a 20 percent higher probability of reporting
constraints. Past defaults signal to the lender a higher probability of future defaults
and, hence, may reduce the supply of credit.
Because mothers of sample respondents were fairly young, between the ages of
14 and 28, at the time they gave birth it is important to examine how the average
mother in my sample compares to the average U.S. mother. This exercise will help
assessing whether it is be possible to extrapolate the results of my analysis to all U.S.
mothers. To do so, Table 2.A-1 in Appendix 2.A presents a comparison of the average
sample characteristics of mothers in the analysis sample and the full NLSY sample of
mothers. The results indicate that sample respondents are somewhat more likely to
be disadvantaged financially relative to the average U.S. mother. The proportion of
liquidity-constrained mothers is 21 percent in the analysis sample and 17 percent in
the representative NLSY79. These fractions are similar to the proportion of liquidity-
constrained evaluated by Jappelli (1990). Using the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF) data, Jappelli estimated that 19 percent of families were rejected for credit or
did not apply because of the fear of being rejected.
Column (II) of Table 2.B-1 presents a logistic regression of the probability of
reporting credit constraints for the full NLSY sample. While there are some differ-
ences in the size and statistical significance of the coefficients across the equations
in Columns (I) and (II), a joint Wald test does not reject the hypothesis that they
are statistically identical. Given this result and the absence of significant correlation
between the age at childbirth and the constraints probability, it appears that we
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should be able to extrapolate the results from the analysis sample to the full sample
of U.S. mothers.12
2.2.2 Young Adults from Constrained and Unconstrained Families
Among 2,707 respondents in the sample, 655 come from families where mothers re-
port liquidity constraints. Weighted by sampling weights, the proportion of youths
in liquidity-constrained families is 21 percent. For notational convenience, I will refer
to youths from constrained families as constrained and youths from unconstrained
families as unconstrained in the rest of the paper. Do constrained youths differ from
unconstrained youths in a way that is consistent with the presence of borrowing lim-
itations? To answer this question columns III and IV of Table 2.2 present average
characteristics of constrained and unconstrained youths in my analysis sample. Con-
strained youths are more likely to be black or Hispanic and to have more siblings.
They are also more likely to have grown up without a father or in an urban area
than the unconstrained youths. Their parents’ average annual income during late
adolescent years is about $18,000 less than average parental income of unconstrained
youths. Average parental wealth of constrained youths is only $36,000, which is
$108,000 lower than the average parental wealth of unconstrained youths.
Unconstrained youths have higher early ability indicators relative to constrained
youths. This difference is not surprising, given the disparities in financial resources
and differences in family background discussed above. I evaluate scholastic ability
using the percentile score on the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT) math
and reading comprehension sections. The PIAT is a measure of academic achieve-
ment that has been widely used in educational research (see, e.g., Heckman, 2006).13
12Unobservable characteristics correlated with early childbirth may make it potentially harder to
extrapolate the results to all U.S. mothers. Hence, the conclusion above is only tentative.
13Earlier studies used the results of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) to control for
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Table 2.2: Select Characteristics of NLSY79 Young Adults Born in 1978-1985
All Constrained Unconstrained t-statsb
I II III IV
Female 0.485 0.480 0.486 0.19
Black 0.195 0.285 0.170 5.93***
Hispanic 0.087 0.104 0.082 2.06**
Father present 0.521 0.446 0.540 3.35***
Urban residence 0.747 0.791 0.735 2.31**
Mother HS graduate 0.869 0.861 0.872 0.59
Mother w/some college 0.354 0.346 0.357 0.41
Number of siblings 1.909 2.120 1.855 3.62***
(1.280) (1.422) (1.236)
PIAT Math score 51.569 49.534 52.127 1.93*
(24.773) (23.758) (25.011)
PIAT Reading score 58.505 56.068 59.186 2.14*
(24.577) (25.856) (24.205)
Parental income (in $10K) 5.549 4.103 5.927 6.62***
(6.714) (3.376) (7.294)
Parental wealth (in $10K) 12.184 3.608 14.426 9.44***
(31.038) (10.178) (34.119)
Additional Financial Characteristics
Has a credit card 0.453 0.388 0.469 2.91***
Credit card debt (in $2007) 1,953 2,177 1,895 0.83
Puts off buying necessities 0.090 0.132 0.079 2.81***
N 2,707 655 2,052
Proportion 100 24.2 75.8
Weighted proportion 100 20.7 79.3
Notes: a) All statistics are weighted by sample weights. b) Testing the hypothesis
of equality of means between constrained and unconstrained: *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05,
***P < 0.10. c) Standard deviations in parentheses.
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I focus on the PIAT scores at age 12. When not available at that particular age,
scores from ages 11 or 13 are used. Table 2.2 shows that PIAT math and reading
scores are lower for young adults from constrained families.
The NLSY79 Adult Supplement also asks a number of questions related to
borrowing and consumption levels of respondents. As supporting evidence, in the
second panel of Table 2.2 I examine how constrained and unconstrained youths an-
swer these questions. It shows that constrained youths are less likely to report having
a credit card than unconstrained youths. Conditional on having a credit card, unpaid
balances of constrained youths are about $300 higher than unpaid balances of un-
constrained youths.14 They are also more likely than unconstrained youths to report
putting off buying necessities. These differences are consistent with the idea that
youths from liquidity-constrained families are more likely to be liquidity-constrained
themselves. Partial correlations of liquidity constraints indicator with family back-
ground and demographic characteristics of sample youths are analyzed in more detail
in Appendix 2.B. The results show that the constraints indicator is strongly correlated
with parental wealth, but not with income.
2.2.3 Educational Attainment and College Tuition
Why may parental liquidity constraints be important for children’s educational at-
tainment? Among other things, children of parents with borrowing constraints may
not be able to rely on them as loan co-signers and hence may face lower borrowing
limits and/or higher interest rates. This may limit their educational choices, in both
how much schooling to pursue and how much to spend on education. While generous
public and private tuition subsidies are available to low-income youths, consumption
scholastic ability. The AFQT consists of ten sections and is generally administered at a later age.
14This difference, however, is not statistically significant
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Table 2.3: Education and College Costs at Age 21, NLSY79 Young Adults and
NLSY97 Representative Sample
All Constrained Unconstrained t-statsb
I II III IV
High school diploma 0.737 0.655 0.759 3.96***
GED 0.132 0.169 0.123 2.20**
Attended college 0.483 0.373 0.512 5.07***
Completed some college 0.445 0.322 0.478 5.86***
Tuition and feesc 8,116 6,722 8,375 2.26**
(336) (626) (380)
Financial aid recipient 0.656 0.726 0.643 2.06**
N 2,707 655 2,052
Notes: a) All statistics are weighted by sample weights. b) Testing the hypothesis
of equality of means between constrained and unconstrained: *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05,
***P < 0.10. c) Standard deviations in parentheses.
during college is generally harder to finance. At the same time, the loss of con-
sumption due to forgone earnings may be substantial and has a potential of affecting
educational attainment of liquidity-constrained individuals (see, e.g., Stinebrickner
and Stinebrickner, 2008).
The young age of the sample respondents limits my ability to analyze final
educational attainment. As a result, I focus on high school graduation and college
enrollment rates. Following Belley and Lochner (2007), I use 21 as a benchmark
age. Respondents are assumed to have finished high school if they have completed at
least 12 years of schooling. Among those who have finished high school I distinguish
between those with a high school diploma and those with a GED. Those who have
attended school beyond 12th grade by age 21 are considered to have attended college,
and those who have completed 13 or more years of schooling are assumed to have
completed at least one year of college education (denoted as “some college”).
What are the differences in educational attainment between constrained and
unconstrained youths in my analysis sample? Columns III and IV of Table 2.3 show
that constrained youths have lower high school graduation rates and college enroll-
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ment rates, and higher GED recipiency rates than unconstrained youths. The high
school graduation rate is 10 percentage points lower for constrained youths relative
to the unconstrained, while their GED recipiency rate is 5 percentage points higher.
The differences between constrained and unconstrained subssamples are even more
pronounced at the college than at the high school level. The differences in enrollment
rate and rate of completion of at least one year of college is 14 percentage points (29
percent) and 16 percentage points (35 percent) respectively.
The second panel of Table 2.3 presents the amount of annual published tu-
ition and fees that respondents who attend college report. This variable captures
the sticker price of college education, which for some students is higher than out-of
pocket expenses because of financial aid. The average tuition and fees that sample
respondents report around the age 21 is $8,116 (in 2007 dollars).15 It is significantly
lower for the constrained youths. The average amount of tuition and fees constrained
youths report is about $6,700 a year, versus $8,400 a year for unconstrained youths.
This indicates that constrained youths attend colleges and universities that are less
expensive on average. At the same time, constrained youths are about 9 percentage
points more likely than the unconstrained to receive financial aid (73 percent vs. 64
percent). There is a possibility, however, that self-reported tuition and fees in the
sample are downward biased, as individuals who receive a financial aid discount may
not know the “sticker price” of their education.
Earlier studies have documented substantial differences in educational attain-
ment by parental income (see, e.g., Manski, 1992; Ellwood and Kane, 2000; Cameron
and Heckman, 1998; Carneiro and Heckman, 2002). Does my measure of liquidity
15During the 2003-2004 school year, when the average sample respondent turned 21, the average
published tuition and fees at a full-time public four-year college in the United States were $5,152,
while tuition and fees at a full-time private college were $21,634 in 2007 dollars (College Board,
2003, converted to 2007 dollars using the CPI index for all urban consumers).
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Figure 2.A: High School Completion by Family Income Figure 2.B: High School Diploma by Family Income
Figure 2.C: College Enrollment by Family Income Figure 2.D: Some College  by Family Income
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constraints provide any additional information beyond that captured by parental in-
come? Conditional on income, what are the differences in education by parental
liquidity constraints? To answer this questions Figures 2.A through 2.D present gaps
in educational attainment between constrained and unconstrained youths, by quartile
of parental income. They reveal that there are almost no difference in high school
graduation rates by liquidity constraints when differences in income are accounted
for. This is not surprising, because although any type of schooling is associated with
opportunity costs, there are no tuition costs associated with high school attendance
and hence the need for borrowing may be lower. At the same time, college enroll-
ment rates and completion of at least one year of college education are lower for
constrained youths, especially at the higher income quantiles where the demand for
college education tends to be higher.16
2.3 Multivariate Analysis
This section presents an analysis of partial correlations between parental liquidity
constraints and children’s educational attainment. While I do not estimate a causal
relationship, the results in this section imply that my indicator of constraints ap-
pears to capture information about individual heterogeneity in college enrollment,
above and beyond that captured by early ability indicators, parental income, and
family background characteristics. Conditional on these factors, parental liquidity
constraints have a strong negative correlation with college enrollment. This correla-
tion is especially strong at the top of the scholastic ability distribution. At the same
time, there is no significant correlation between parental liquidity constraints and high
school graduation or completion of more than two years of college education. The
16These differences are statistically significant only at the highest income quantile. Standard errors
are available from the author upon request.
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second part of the section examines self-reported tuition and fees of youths enrolled
in college at age 21. Conditional on income, ability, and family background charac-
teristics, parental liquidity constraints do not appear to be correlated with tuition
and fees.
2.3.1 Educational Attainment
Table 2.4 presents coefficients and marginal effects from logistic regression estimates
of probabilities of finishing high school and of having completed at least one year of
college education by age 21 (denoted as “Some College” in the table).17 I employ
regression specifications similar to those in Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Bel-
ley and Lochner (2007), and introduce my indicator of liquidity constraints as an
additional variable. Control variables include parental income and ability measures
during adolescence, plus the basic demographic and family background characteristics
examined in Table 2.2. To allow for possible non-linearities in the relationship and
for comparability with the earlier studies, parental income and ability test scores are
expressed as quartile indicators. Family background characteristics include number
of siblings, presence of a father in the household at age 14, residence in a metropoli-
tan/urban area at age 14, mother’s age at birth, and mother’s education. Finally, I
allow for differences by race and ethnicity (blacks, Hispanics, and whites), and gender.
Table 2.4 shows that, conditional on scholastic ability, parental income, and
family background characteristics, parental liquidity constraints have a significant
negative correlation with college attendance but not with high school completion.
A joint Wald χ2 test rejects the hypothesis that coefficients on parental liquidity
constraints are equal across the two equations at the 1 percent level. This result is
17Logistic estimates of the probability of graduating with a high school diploma and of being
enrolled in college at age 21 are very similar and hence are not reported.
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Table 2.4: Probability of High School Completion and College Attendance
High School Completion Some College Edu.
Coeff. Marg. Eff. Coeff. Marg. Eff.
Parents liquidity-constrained -0.144 -0.017 -0.312*** -0.071***
(0.141) (0.017) (0.117) (0.026)
Female 0.386*** 0.044*** 0.684*** 0.158***
(0.114) (0.013) (0.091) (0.021)
Black 0.328** 0.036** 0.135 0.032
(0.153) (0.016) (0.117) (0.027)
Hispanic -0.022 -0.002 0.160 0.038
(0.164) (0.019) (0.132) (0.031)
Mother’s age at birth 0.093*** 0.011*** 0.064*** 0.015***
(0.028) (0.003) (0.024) (0.006)
Mother HS graduate 0.360** 0.045** 0.883*** 0.186***
(0.153) (0.021) (0.177) (0.032)
Mother some college 0.485*** 0.052*** 0.611*** 0.145***
(0.157) (0.016) (0.102) (0.024)
Father present 0.286** 0.032** 0.481*** 0.113***
(0.130) (0.014) (0.103) (0.024)
Number of siblings -0.202*** -0.023*** -0.104** -0.024**
(0.046) (0.005) (0.043) (0.010)
Urban residence -0.147 -0.016 -0.143 -0.034
(0.144) (0.016) (0.115) (0.027)
Combined PIAT Score: Quartile 2 0.682*** 0.069*** 0.612*** 0.147***
(0.142) (0.013) (0.137) (0.033)
Quartile 3 0.888*** 0.087*** 0.906*** 0.218***
(0.153) (0.013) (0.137) (0.033)
Quartile 4 1.540*** 0.136*** 1.392*** 0.332***
(0.198) (0.014) (0.137) (0.031)
Parental Income: Quartile 2 0.262* 0.028* 0.189 0.045
(0.141) (0.015) (0.142) (0.034)
Quartile 3 0.959*** 0.093*** 0.557*** 0.134***
(0.175) (0.014) (0.142) (0.035)
Quartile 4 1.018*** 0.097*** 0.855*** 0.206***
(0.199) (0.016) (0.149) (0.036)
Constant -6.209*** -5.967***
(1.313) (1.098)
Log likelihood -1,061 -1,512
Pseudo R-squared 0.169 0.173
χ2-test of equal coefficients
on liquidity constraints 9.15***
N 2,707 2,707
Notes: a) Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering within families.
b) Includes cohort controls. c) *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.10.
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consistent with our understanding that liquidity constraints are more likely to operate
at college level, since high school education is tuition-free. Constraints are associated
with a 7 percentage-point lower probability of finishing at least one year of college by
age 21. Given the total fraction of individuals with at least some college education
in the sample, this corresponds to a 16-percent difference in the college attendance
rate.
Scholastic ability during adolescence has a strong correlation with both high
school graduation and college attendance.18 The probability of high school gradua-
tion and college attendance is increasing with ability. The correlation with college
attendance is stronger than with high school completion. Individuals from the top of
ability distribution are 18 percent (14 percentage points) more likely to finish highs
school and about 75 percent more likely (33 percentage points) to finish at least one
year of college by age 21 than their counterparts from the bottom of ability distribu-
tion. There are also some differences by location in the ability distribution.
Parental income also has a strong positive correlation with education at age
21, even after controlling for family background, scholastic ability, and liquidity con-
straints. The difference in probability of high school completion between the highest
and the lowest income quartiles is 13 percent (10 percentage points), while the dif-
ference in college attendance probability is 46 percent (21 percentage points). This
result is similar to Belley and Lochner (2007), who also find that parental income
is highly correlated with college attendance, after controlling for ability and family
background characteristics.
Table 2.4 also shows that, conditional on parental income, ability, and family
background, race and ethnicity have a positive, but insignificant correlation with
18This result is consistent with the findings of Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Belley and
Lochner (2007).
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the probability of college attendance.19 Other controls, except for urban residency
during adolescence, are highly statistically significant and have the signs that are
consistent with the findings of earlier studies and our economic intuition. Children
born to older or more educated mothers have a higher probability of earning a high
school diploma and continuing on to college, as are those with a father living in the
household during their adolescent years. Having fewer siblings is also correlated with
a higher probability of finishing high school and enrolling in college.20 Women have
a higher probability than men of finishing high school and receiving at least some
college education.
Some studies (e.g. Kane, 2007; Belley and Lochner, 2007) point out that, since
income tends to fluctuate from year to year, family wealth may be more indicative of a
family’s ability to finance college education. At the same time, wealth may capture a
family’s desire to save for college and may have a stronger correlation with the ability
to borrow than does income. To explore these issues, Table 2.B-3 in Appendix 2.B
presents two logistic regressions similar to those in Table 2.4, with income quartiles
replaced by quartiles of family wealth. The results indicate that wealth is similar to
income in its correlation with education at age 21. However, conditioning on wealth
instead of income reduces the correlation between liquidity constraints and college
attendance: liquidity-constrained youths are only 5 percentage points less likely to
receive some college education than unconstrained youths. Moreover, a Wald χ2 test
does not reject a hypothesis that coefficients on parental liquidity constraints across
the two equations are jointly zero.
19Belley and Lochner (2007) show that, all else equal, non-whites are significantly more likely to
attend college. Their sample, however, excludes the minority oversample and children not living at
home at age 16 or 17.
20This result is intuitive because fewer siblings implies having access to a bigger share of parental
resources both in terms of time and money.
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Table 2.5: Gaps in Educational Attainment Between Constrained and Unconstrained
Young Adults in NLSY79, by Ability Terciles
All Bottom PIAT Middle PIAT Top PIAT
Raw Cond. Raw Cond. Raw Cond. Raw Cond.
Panel A - High School Completion, Age 21
-0.044*** -0.015 -0.029 -0.017 0.068** -0.021 -0.008 -0.004
(0.017) (0.018) (0.035) (0.040) (0.028) (0.026) (0.021) (0.017)
Panel B - High School Diploma, Age 21
-0.059*** -0.031 -0.038 -0.035 -0.069** -0.027 -0.041 -0.033
(0.020) (0.024) (0.037) (0.044) (0.035) (0.038) (0.030) (0.030)
Panel C - GED, Age 21
0.019 0.010 0.018 0.019 0.006 0.000 0.031 0.015
(0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.025) (0.022)
Panel D - College Attendance, Age 21
-0.090*** -0.058** -0.039 -0.030 -0.112*** -0.060 -0.084** -0.078*
(0.022) (0.026) (0.032) (0.033) (0.039) (0.045) (0.038) (0.045)
Panel E - Some College Education, Age 21
-0.094*** -0.066** -0.050 -0.039 -0.113*** -0.064 -0.083** -0.082*
(0.022) (0.026) (0.031) (0.030) (0.039) (0.043) (0.039) (0.046)
Panel F - Completed Two or More Years of College, Age 21
-0.050*** -0.011 0.018 0.020 -0.070** -0.018 -0.075* -0.051
(0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.034) (0.035) 0.034 (0.045)
Panel G - Completed Two or More Years of College, Age 23
-0.043* -0.012 0.013 0.021 -0.061 -0.028 -0.070 -0.061
(0.024) (0.027) (0.031) (0.033) (0.042) (0.043) (0.046) (0.055)
Panel H - Completed Four or More Years of College, Age 23
-0.043*** -0.017 -0.020 -0.015 -0.044 -0.018 -0.057 -0.033
(0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.013) (0.029) (0.024) (0.039) (0.039)
Notes: a) Robust standard errors in parentheses. b) All results are presented relative to the
unconstrained respondents. c) Adjusted gaps are marginal effects from logit regressions.
d) *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.10. e) Sample size in panels F and G is 1,996 observations.
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The primary aim of higher education financing policies is to provide talented
liquidity-constrained students with access to college education. Because the demand
for college education is positively correlated with scholastic ability, it is instructive
to examine correlations between parental liquidity constraints and educational at-
tainment separately at different points of the ability distribution. Table 2.5 presents
gaps in high school graduation and GED recipiency rates, and gaps in completion
of at least one, two, or four years of college education by ability terciles. Gaps in
two and four years of college completion are evaluated for a part of the sample that
has reached age 23 by the last interview. Conditional gaps presented in Table 2.5
are marginal effects from logistic regressions of educational outcomes on the same
variables as in Table 2.4.21 The results show that parental liquidity constraints are
strongly correlated with the probability of college attendance and completion of at
least one year of college, but not with the probabilities of high school graduation,
GED recipiency, or completion of two or more years of college education. The corre-
lations between liquidity constraints and college attendance are especially strong for
individuals at the top of the ability distribution. The last column of Table 2.5 shows
that for high-ability youths, liquidity constraints are associated with a 16 percent (8
percentage-point) lower probability of enrollment and an 18 percent (8 percentage-
point) lower probability of completing at least one year of college, after conditioning
on family background characteristics and parental income.
As discussed in the previous section, however, the credit constraints indicator
may simply capture the desire to live beyond one’s means. More specifically, an
individual may wish to borrow more than he or she could possibly repay, attempting
to violate their lifetime budget constraint. This may include borrowing to finance
tuition or consumption while in school. Unfortunately, in the context of this study,
21The regression results are available from the author upon request.
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it is impossible to distinguish between the families that are facing the supply-side
constraints and those who wish to borrow more than they could repay. However,
because individuals with higher wealth levels are able to put up more collateral,
they are less likely to face supply-side constraints. Hence, it is important to focus our
attention on the young adults from the lower portion of the family wealth distribution.
Table 2.B-4 in Appendix 2.B presents estimates of the probability of high school
completion and college attendance calculated separately for the two halves of parental
wealth distribution. Similar to the results in Table 2.4, parental liquidity constraints
have a negative correlation with the probability of receiving some college education,
but no significant correlation with the probability of high school completion for the
young adults in the lower portion of the distribution. For the young adults in the top
portion of wealth distribution there is no significant correlation between education
probabilities and parental liquidity constraints. There are also other differences in the
estimates between the top and bottom halves of the wealth distribution. For example,
minority status has a positive correlation with education probabilities for young adults
in the bottom half of the distribution, but not in the top half. By contrast, presence
of a father in the household and mother’s age at birth are significantly correlated
with education probabilities of youths in the top but not the bottom half of wealth
distribution. A joint Wald test indicates that the coefficients estimated for the two
wealth sub-samples differ significantly.
The results presented in this section show that, even after controlling for
parental income, parental liquidity constraints have a negative correlation with chil-
dren’s college attendance probabilities. There are two potential and not mutually ex-
clusive explanations for this result. The first explanation is that income and liquidity
constraints are not perfectly correlated, so that my indicator of constraints may cap-
ture an additional dimension of families’ financial situation, correlated with children’s
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educational decisions.22 As discussed above, income in a given year is an imperfect
measure of financial resources and the ability to pay for college. Moreover, higher
parental resources may not necessarily translate into willingness to finance children’s
college education or consumption while in school. As indicated by Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner (2008), forgone consumption is an important part of educational costs
and are much harder to finance than tuition. At the same time, as discussed earlier,
credit rejections may simply indicate the desire to consume more than is feasible,
given the lifetime budget constraint.
The second explanation of my results may be that parental liquidity constraints
are correlated with unobservable family background characteristics that are, in turn,
correlated with lower educational attainment. For example, financial negligence and
bad spending habits may result in higher interest rates and lower borrowing limits. At
the same time, financial negligence of parents may also be correlated with children’s
poor non-cognitive skills, such as self-discipline and reliability. While non-cognitive
skills are important for educational attainment, they are not necessarily captured by
standard ability test scores (Heckman and Krueger, 2005). Unfortunately, it is not
possible to sort between these two potential explanations in this descriptive study.
2.3.2 Tuition and Fees
Educational institutions in the United States provide widely differing experiences.
Attending Harvard is clearly different in both cost and quality of education from at-
tending a community college. College costs are a very important, but largely ignored
margin of schooling choice. Because of limited data availability, most earlier studies
of credit constraints in education have focused on enrollment and educational attain-
22This is plausible, given the weak partial correlations between parental income and the probability
of being from a liquidity-constrained family, presented in Table 2.B-2 in the Appendix.
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ment.23 However, there is a great variation in published tuition and fees both across
the types of educational institutions and among institutions with similar character-
istics. In the 2003-2004 school year, close to 15 percent of undergraduates in public
and private four-year colleges were enrolled in institutions with tuition and fees of
$20,000 or higher, while almost one-third were enrolled in institutions with tuition
and fees of less than $4,000 a year (College Board, 2003, current dollars). At the
same time, the average published annual tuition and fees were $19,710 for a four-year
private college and only $1,905 for a two-year public college.
What is the correlation between parental liquidity constraints and self-reported
tuition and fees at the institutions that sample respondents attend? It is difficult to
answer this question intuitively, since there are two considerations that work in oppo-
site directions, making the relationship a priori ambiguous. On one hand, some stud-
ies argue that the range of alternatives available to students appears to be sharply con-
strained by family resources and ability to borrow (see, e.g., McPherson and Schapiro,
2007). Although what students actually pay differs substantially from published tu-
ition and fees because of financial aid, it is still likely that credit-constrained students
on average choose lower-cost schooling options than unconstrained students. This
implies a negative correlation between published tuition and the indicator of credit
constraints. On the other hand, it is possible that parents are liquidity-constrained
because they have borrowed up to their credit limit in order to finance their children’s
expensive college education. In this case, the correlation would be positive.
With these considerations in mind, I regress log tuition costs on an indicator of
liquidity constraints (see Column I of Table 2.6). Other controls include an indicator
23Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Belley and Lochner (2007) also examined college delays and
enrollment in two-year vs. four-year colleges. While (Kane, 1994) examined sensitivity of low-income
students to tuition costs and (Kane, 1996) focused on college enrollment delays’ relationship with
tuition, these studies used state-level average tuition data.
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for financial aid recipiency, and a set of parental and individual characteristics similar
to those in Table 2.4. The analysis sample for this regression is limited to youths who
have attended college by age 21 and have reported tuition and fees. Table 2.6 shows
that tuition costs are not significantly correlated with parental liquidity constraints,
which may be a result of the two tendencies described above working in the opposite
directions.
At the same time, tuition costs have a strong positive correlation with family
income and student’s ability. A 1-percent higher parental income is associated with a
7-percent higher college tuition. This is consistent with earlier findings that higher-
income parents provide more resources for college attendance than lower-income fam-
ilies (Ellwood and Kane, 2000). Higher scholastic ability is associated with higher
tuition costs: being in the top ability quartile is associated with a 35 percent higher
tuition. A standard possible explanation for this finding is that smarter youths enroll
in better universities, which are usually more expensive. Mother’s education is associ-
ated with higher college costs. Children of mothers with at least a high school degree
report attending colleges that are about 30 percent more expensive than colleges
attended by children of mothers without a high school degree. This difference is 50
percent between children of mothers with at least some college education and mothers
without a high school degree. Receiving financial aid is associated with 57 percent
higher tuition costs.24 Among demographic characteristics, Hispanic ethnicity and
being a woman are correlated with lower tuition costs.
Splitting the sample by parental wealth (see Columns II and III of Table 2.6)
does not significantly alter the weak correlation between tuition cost and the credit
constraints indicator. Separate analysis of the two sub-samples, however, improve the
24One possible interpretation of this result is that more expensive institutions are more likely to
provide financial aid.
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Table 2.6: OLS: Log Tuition and Fees
All Low Wealth High Wealth
(I) (II) (III)
Parents liquidity-constrained -0.027 0.052 -0.086
(0.099) (0.116) (0.182)
Female -0.163** -0.305*** -0.034
(0.078) (0.110) (0.110)
Black -0.148 -0.124 -0.107
(0.094) (0.118) (0.181)
Hispanic -0.429*** -0.418*** -0.379**
(0.116) (0.160) (0.161)
Mother HS graduate 0.287* 0.261 0.363
(0.157) (0.180) (0.260)
Mother some college 0.198** 0.140 0.262**
(0.084) (0.117) (0.120)
Father present 0.111 0.002 0.180
(0.081) (0.108) (0.130)
Number of siblings -0.060 -0.063 -0.058
(0.037) (0.049) (0.050)
Urban residence 0.045 0.245* -0.121
(0.090) (0.126) (0.124)
Combined PIAT score: Quartile 2 0.096 -0.143 0.424**
(0.140) (0.190) (0.206)
Quartile 3 0.285** 0.134 0.529***
(0.129) (0.173) (0.194)
Quartile 4 0.347*** 0.171 0.609***
(0.126) (0.173) (0.188)
Log parental income 0.069*** 0.044 0.106**
(0.027) (0.035) (0.045)
Financial aid 0.569*** 0.809*** 0.410***
(0.099) (0.159) (0.119)
Constant 8.396*** 8.164*** 7.991***
(0.553) (0.711) (0.889)
R-squared 0.148 0.159 0.156
N 905 454 451
χ2-test of equal coefficients:
– on liquidity constraints binary: 0.42
– on all variables: 1.52*
Notes: a) Robust standard errors in parenthesis. b) *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.10.
c) Includes cohort controls.
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fit of the model in both parts of the wealth distribution. A joint Wlad test rejects the
hypothesis of equal coefficients across the two equations. In the lower-wealth group,
gender, financial aid, and urban residence are the important correlates of tuition
costs. In the higher-wealth group, tuition costs are strongly correlated with parental
income, education, and with individual ability test scores and financial aid recipiency.
2.4 Conclusions
This paper uses self-reported information on borrowing difficulties to evaluate the
proportion of college-age adults in liquidity-constrained families in the early 2000s.
The results indicate that this proportion is substantial: over 20 percent of sample
respondents come from constrained families. The fraction of all children in liquidity-
constrained families is somewhat smaller, around 18 percent. These results are similar
to the findings of Jappelli (1990), who estimated that the fraction of rejected and
discouraged borrowers in the SCF data was 19 percent. Similar to Jappelli (1990),
I also find that minority, single, and younger mothers have a higher probability of
credit rejections.
Not all rejected borrowers, however, can be considered credit-constrained.
Some individuals may apply for more credit than they could possibly repay, at-
tempting to violate their lifetime budget constraints. Rejection of such borrowers
who have excess demand for credit does not constitute a market failure and is not a
manifestation of credit constraints. While it is empirically impossible to distinguish
between individuals with excess demand for credit and those facing supply-side con-
straints, I attempt to control for individual credit-worthiness by splitting the sample
by parental wealth. Parental wealth can serve as a collateral, hence young adults
from higher-wealth families may be less likely to face the supply-side constraints.
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Analysis of simple correlations and partial correlations indicate that my mea-
sure of liquidity constraints captures some important aspects of individual hetero-
geneity in college attendance decisions, beyond the information provided by standard
ability and socioeconomic indicators. These correlations are substantially weaker for
young adults in the upper portion of the family wealth distribution.
While the evidence presented in the paper shows that youths from families
with borrowing difficulties are less likely to attend college, one should be careful in
ascribing causality to this relationship. Parental borrowing difficulties may simply
reflect unmeasured differences in family background that are strongly associated with
children’s educational choices. To understand the exact relationship between parental
liquidity constraints and children’s educational decisions explicit modeling is required.
Together with the first chapter (Sorokina, 2009), this paper investigates the
use of direct survey questions to evaluate the proportion of students financially con-
strained in their educational choices. Apart from the focus on different time periods
– early 1980s in Sorokina (2009) and early 2000s in this paper – there are some im-
portant differences in survey questions that prompt different interpretations of the
results. In Sorokina (2009) I construct an indicator of constraints using the informa-
tion on discrepancies between educational aspirations and expectations together with
the information on financial difficulties. Because of question wording and the syn-
thetic nature of my indicator, individuals with lower net benefits to education may be
more likely classified as credit-constrained. To make sure that individual assessments
of costs and benefits of education do not filter into the definition of constraints, in
this paper I use parental assessments of borrowing difficulties.
Despite these important differences in operational definitions, the correlates
of constraints are similar across the two papers. For example, parental financial
resources are negatively correlated with constraints probability, while minority status
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has a positive correlation. Moreover, in both papers the indicator of constraints is
highly correlated with college enrollment rates, even after controls for parental income
and ability are introduced. The descriptive results presented in this paper and in
Sorokina (2009) indicate that, despite potential problems, information on financial
constraints elicited by direct survey methods is valuable and economists may benefit
from using it in empirical studies.
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Chapter 2 Appendices
Appendix 2.A: Comparison of the Analysis Sample and the Representative
NLSY Sample
Mothers of sample respondents were fairly young, between the ages of 14 and 28 at
the time they gave birth. To access whether it would be possible to extrapolate the
results of my subsequent analysis to all U.S. mothers, I want to see how the average
mother in my sample compares to the average U.S. mother. Table 2.A-1 presents a
comparison of the average sample characteristics of mothers in the analysis sample
and the full NLSY sample of mothers. The comparison shows that the average age
at childbirth in the representative NLSY79 is slightly over 26, while it is less than 22
in my analysis sample. Mothers in the analysis sample are more likely to be black or
Hispanic and to have less education. They are also worse-off financially on average
than mothers in the NLSY79. Sixteen percent of mothers in the analysis sample
and 12 percent of mothers in the representative NLSY79 live below the poverty line.
Median annual family income of mothers in the analysis sample is $52,000 (in 2007
dollars) compared to $66,000 for the average mother in the NSLY79. Mothers in
the analysis sample also have less wealth than the average mother, with the median
$62,000 vs. $104,000.25 These differences indicate that the fraction of liquidity-
constrained mothers may be larger in the analysis sample than in the full NLSY79
sample of mothers. Since sample respondents are more likely to be disadvantaged
financially, they represent a group that is of specific concern to policy-makers.
25Net wealth includes the net value of home and other real estate, plus the net value of vehicles
and business. Also added is the money kept on bank accounts and assets, such as bills, bonds, and
pension savings. Loans and credit card debts are subtracted.
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Table 2.A-1: Select Characteristics of the NLSY79 Mothers
Analysis Sample Representative Sample T-stat.
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Age at childbirth 21.550 2.742 26.386 6.024 46.64***
Black 0.186 0.142 4.60***
Hispanic 0.082 0.068 2.50**
Married 0.615 0.680 3.85***
Urban residence 0.751 0.786 1.46
Education 12.675 2.140 13.430 2.413 9.26***
Number of children 2.698 2.191 2.372 2.112 8.17***
Mean family income in $10K 6.486 6.292 8.068 7.889 6.06***
Median family income in $10K 5.158 6.585
Mean family income by quartile:
Quartile 1 0.958 0.565 1.248 0.760 6.14***
Quartile 2 3.075 0.663 3.901 0.800 15.49***
Quartile 3 5.869 0.985 7.174 1.043 18.55***
Quartile 4 12.765 7.448 16.046 9.689 5.71***
Poverty rate 0.163 0.124 2.93***
Mean family net worth in $10K 16.484 35.004 25.238 48.775 5.48***
Median family net worth in $10K 6.179 10.333
Mean family net worth by quartile:
Quartile 1 -1.516 7.781 -1.541 8.250 0.04
Quartile 2 1.445 1.012 3.108 1.811 16.69***
Quartile 3 8.217 2.987 13.038 4.324 19.48***
Quartile 4 45.186 50.983 66.483 68.619 5.28***
Constrained mothers 0.209 0.173 2.65***
Constrained children 0.220 0.180 3.75***
Notes: a) All statistics are weighted by sampling weights. b) Testing the hypothesis of equality
of means between constrained and unconstrained: *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.10.
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Appendix 2.B: Additional Tables
Table 2.B-1: Probability of Reporting Constraints, NLSY79 Mothers
(I) (II)
Analysis Sample Full Sample
Marg. Eff. S.E Marg. Eff. S.E
Age -0.019 0.006*** -0.005 0.003
Married -0.061 0.025** -0.060 0.018***
Black 0.089 0.030*** 0.062 0.020***
Hispanic 0.044 0.034 0.037 0.022*
Education 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.003
Age at birth 0.008 0.005 -0.002 0.001
Family size 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.005
Urban residence -0.011 0.023 -0.034 0.015**
North-east -0.038 0.036 -0.053 0.020***
North central 0.007 0.028 0.003 0.019
West 0.087 0.035** 0.046 0.022**
Log wealth -0.042 0.006*** -0.042 0.004***
Log income -0.007 0.004* -0.003 0.003
Log debt -0.001 0.017 -0.002 0.012
Log likelihood -1,404 -825
Pseudo R-squared 0.124 0.104
χ2-test of equal coefficients
across equations (df. 16) 12.71
N 3,104 1,628
Notes: a) *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.10.
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Table 2.B-2: Correlates of Being from a Constrained Family
Marg. Effects S.E.
Female -0.006 0.016
Black 0.068 0.030**
Hispanic 0.020 0.033
Mothers age at birth -0.008 0.005
Mothers education 0.011 0.005**
Father present 0.033 0.023
Number of siblings 0.011 0.009
Urban residence 0.042 0.024*
Parental Wealth: Quartile 2 -0.034 0.023
Quartile 3 -0.066 0.026**
Quartile 4 -0.212 0.024***
Parental Income: Quartile 2 0.005 0.025
Quartile 3 -0.014 0.028
Quartile 4 0.013 0.037
Puts off bying necessities 0.050 0.029*
Has a credit card -0.005 0.018
Log likelihood -1,410
Pseudo R-squared 0.059
N 2,707
Notes: a) Robust standard errors. b) *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.10.
c) Includes cohort controls.
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Table 2.B-3: Probability of Having a High School Diploma or Some College Education
High School Diploma Some College
Coeff. Marg. Eff. Coeff. Marg. Eff.
Parents liquidity-constrained -0.078 -0.009 -0.209* -0.048*
(0.139) (0.016) (0.115) (0.026)
Female 0.390*** 0.044*** 0.694*** 0.161***
(0.114) (0.013) (0.091) (0.021)
Black 0.341** 0.037** 0.210* 0.050*
(0.156) (0.016) (0.119) (0.028)
Hispanic 0.019 0.002 0.236* 0.056*
(0.163) (0.018) (0.132) (0.032)
Mother’s age at birth 0.086*** 0.010*** 0.060** 0.014**
(0.028) (0.003) (0.024) (0.006)
Mother HS graduate 0.448*** 0.057*** 0.930*** 0.195***
(0.153) (0.022) (0.175) (0.031)
Mother some college 0.523*** 0.056*** 0.626*** 0.149***
(0.156) (0.016) (0.102) (0.024)
Father present 0.303** 0.034** 0.486*** 0.114***
(0.130) (0.014) (0.101) (0.024)
Number of siblings -0.196*** -0.022*** -0.094** -0.022**
(0.045) (0.005) (0.042) (0.010)
Urban residence -0.113 -0.012 -0.132 -0.031
(0.144) (0.016) (0.114) (0.027)
Combined PIAT Score: Quartile 2 0.679*** 0.068*** 0.604*** 0.145***
(0.142) (0.013) (0.138) (0.033)
Quartile 3 0.885*** 0.086*** 0.896*** 0.216***
(0.152) (0.013) (0.136) (0.033)
Quartile 4 1.527*** 0.134*** 1.396*** 0.333***
(0.198) (0.014) (0.137) (0.031)
Parental Wealth: Quartile 2 0.133 0.015 0.165 0.039
(0.144) (0.015) (0.139) (0.033)
Quartile 3 0.692*** 0.069*** 0.508*** 0.122***
(0.173) (0.015) (0.139) (0.034)
Quartile 4 1.196*** 0.110*** 1.042*** 0.251***
(0.234) (0.017) (0.150) (0.036)
Constant -6.219*** -6.210***
(1.298) (1.095)
Log likelihood -1,060 -1,502
Pseudo R-squared 0.169 0.178
χ2-test of equal coefficients
on liquidity constraints 3.96
N 2,707 2,707
Notes: a) Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering within families.
b) Includes cohort controls. c) *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.10.
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Table 2.B-4: Probability of High School Completion and College Attendance
High School Completion Some College Edu.
Low Wealth High Wealth Low Wealth High Wealth
Parents liquidity-constrained -0.043 0.020 -0.046* -0.047
(0.029) (0.013) (0.026) (0.043)
Female 0.046* 0.036*** 0.125*** 0.171***
(0.024) (0.012) (0.024) (0.031)
Black 0.135*** -0.017 0.104*** -0.011
(0.032) (0.016) (0.033) (0.040)
Hispanic 0.070** -0.034* 0.092** 0.033
(0.032) (0.020) (0.043) (0.043)
Mothers age at birth 0.009 0.009*** 0.001 0.026***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008)
Mother HS graduate 0.049 0.031 0.110*** 0.250***
(0.033) (0.025) (0.031) (0.065)
Mother some college 0.059* 0.040*** 0.112*** 0.163***
(0.030) (0.013) (0.032) (0.033)
Father present 0.026 0.022* 0.045 0.141***
(0.028) (0.013) (0.030) (0.034)
Number of siblings -0.039*** -0.008 -0.031*** -0.008
(0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.017)
Urban residence -0.021 -0.018 0.006 -0.081**
(0.030) (0.012) (0.031) (0.039)
Combined PIAT Score: Quartile 2 0.115*** 0.023* 0.132*** 0.117**
(0.023) (0.013) (0.040) (0.048)
Quartile 3 0.155*** 0.025** 0.162*** 0.216***
(0.023) (0.012) (0.041) (0.044)
Quartile 4 0.204*** 0.065*** 0.296*** 0.312***
(0.023) (0.014) (0.046) (0.041)
Parental Income: Quartile 2 0.040 0.019 0.064* -0.050
(0.027) (0.013) (0.033) (0.065)
Quartile 3 0.098*** 0.062*** 0.136*** 0.035
(0.031) (0.013) (0.041) (0.059)
Quartile 4 0.062 0.055*** 0.098* 0.101*
(0.044) (0.017) (0.055) (0.056)
Log likelihood -676 -353 -690 -793
Pseudo R-squared 0.130 0.187 0.141 0.151
χ2-test of equal coefficients:
– on liquidity constraints binary 4.79** 0.11
– on all variables 30.65*** 28.54**
N 1,355 1,352 1,355 1,352
Notes: a) Marginal effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering within
families. b) Includes cohort controls. c) *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.10.
